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ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AUDITS: THE ARKANSAS
EXPERIENCE
Timothy T Jones*
Walter G. Wright, Jr."
Mary Ellen Ternes""
I. INTRODUCTION
Various environmental regulatory requirements affect almost every
business' operating in the United States. These requirements may range from
simply submitting a form to a governmental agency identifying the type of
substances generated2 to mandated leak detection and prevention requirements
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1. Note that small businesses are also affected by governmental requirements. See
Walter G. Wright, Jr., In Storage Tank Funds We Trust: An Analysis of Their Role in Protecting
the Environment and Small Business, 13 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 417 (1991) (discussion of
impact of underground storage tank regulatory program on small businesses). An example is
a 1996 Congressional hearing held to examine the environmental issues confronted by a
particular small business-dry cleaners. See generally Environmental Compliance Problems
Facing Dry Cleaners: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1996).
2. An example is the federal Solid Waste Disposal Act, which prescribes various
requirements for generators of substances meeting the definition of "hazardous waste." A
facility generating substances meeting the definition of hazardous waste must obtain an
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for petroleum underground storage tanks' or the need to obtain a complex air
permit whose terms regulate many aspects of a manufacturing facility.4 The
federal and state environmental protection agencies utilize enforcement
mechanisms to deter noncompliance with these requirements.5 The enforce-
ment mechanisms may include authority to issue compliance orders, adminis-
tratively assess penalties or bring civil or criminal judicial actions.6 Individuals
may even be subject to such sanctions in certain circumstances.7
identification number by submitting a designated form. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6922 (Supp.
1998). Arkansas' primary environmental regulatory agency, the Arkansas Department of
Pollution Control & Ecology ("ADPC&E") has assumed delegation of this federal program and
the state regulations prescribing this requirement are found at ADPC&E Reg. No. 23, 262.12.
The ADPC&E's name will be changed to the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality,
effective in 1999. See 1997 Ark. Acts 1219 § 2(a.).
3. See Wright, supra note 1.
4. Both the federal and Arkansas air permitting programs are examined in some detail
in Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Mary Ellen Henry, The Arkansas Air Pollution Control Program:
Past Present and Future, 51 ARK. L. REv. 227 (1998).
5. See generally Daniel Riesel, Environmental Enforcement: Civil and Criminal (1997).
Note that enforcement is not the exclusive method used to deter noncompliance. For example,
the Arkansas Petroleum Storage Tank Trust Fund Act provides owners and operators of
underground storage tanks financial reimbursement (up to certain limits) of corrective action
costs and/or third party bodily injury and property damage claims related to leaks and spills
from this type of equipment. See ADPC&E Reg. No. 12. The reimbursement of monies is
predicated on whether the underground storage tank was in substantial compliance with the
relevant federal and state environmental regulatory requirements at the time of the "occurrence"
(i.e. leak or spill). See id. The various state petroleum storage tank trust funds, including
Arkansas' are examined in Wright, supra note 1. Another example is the thirty percent tax
credit the State of Arkansas provides for the cost of acquiring waste reduction, reuse, or
recycling equipment. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-501 et seq. The statute requires a refund
of the tax credit if within three years of the taxable year for which the credit is allowed:
"... . (B) The Director of the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology
finds that the taxpayer has demonstrated a pattern of intentional failure to comply
with final administrative or judicial orders which clearly indicates a disregard for
environmental regulation or a pattern of prohibited conduct which could reasonably
be expected to result in adverse impact." ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-506(f)(1)(B).
This tax credit is summarized in Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Ark Monroe, III, Recycling in
Arkansas: Selected Policy and Legal Issues, ARK. LAW 12 (July 1992). For a 1996 survey of
various state recycling tax credit programs see Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Albert J. Thomas, III,
Corporate Income Tax Credits for the Acquisition of Recycling Equipment: An Analysis of
Various State Programs, Presentation at the Air & Waste Management Association's 89th
Annual Meeting (June 1996).
6. See generally Reisel, supra note 5. The Arkansas administrative and enforcement
procedures are discussed in Wright & Henry, supra note 4, at 348-60 & 393-94.
7. An example would include the federal Clean Air Act, which may impose personal
liability on corporate officers and directors under certain circumstances. For a brief discussion
of personal liability under the federal Clean Air Act, see Wright & Henry, supra note 4, at 292.
For a broader discussion of potential individual liability under several federal environmental
statutes, see generally Andrew M. Goldberg, Corporate Officer Liability for Federal
Environmental Statute Violations, 18 B.C. ENVT'L. AFF. L. REv. 357 (1991); Maya K. van
Rossum, Corporate Noncompliance with the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts: Theories to Hold
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Enforcement of the federal environmental statutory and regulatory
requirements is not confined to governmental agencies. Almost every one of
the federal environmental statutes provides private groups and individuals the
opportunity to utilize the civil judicial enforcement authorities to assess
penalties8 given the proper circumstances. 9 For example there has been a
significant number of federal Clean Water Act citizen suits in the past twenty-
five years.' 0 Furthermore, because of several federal Clean Air Act develop-
ments an increasing number of citizen suits involving this statute are
expected. " Various citizen suit actions have been prosecuted in Arkansas. 2
The sheer complexity 3 and volume 4 of environmental regulatory
requirements applicable to many facilities renders continuous or one hundred
percent compliance difficult. 5 Companies or facilities striving for compliance
a Director Personally Liable, 13 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 99 (1993); Richard S. Porter, Environmental
Law: Does the Application of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine Apply to the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 687 (1992).
8. The penalties assessed are typically deposited in the United States Treasury. See
generally Elizabeth R. Thagard, Note, The Rule That Clean Water Act Civil Penalties Must Go
to the Treasury and How to Avoid It, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 507 (1992). A prevailing
citizen suit plaintiff may also be entitled to the costs and attorney fees incurred prosecuting the
action. See Sheldon M. Novick, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 12-190.19 (1998).
9. See David Sive & Frank Friedman, A PRACTICAL GUIDE To ENvIRONMENTAL LAW
302 (1997).
10. See Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello, THE CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 515
(1998). One commentator states that a dramatic increase in Clean Water Act citizen suits
occurred around 1982. See Novick, supra note 7, at 12-190.5. Another author notes:
"Environmental plaintiffs have filed hundreds of successful citizen suits during the past three
decades, resulting in billions of dollars in compliance costs, civil penalties, and supplemental
environmental projects--as well as the assessment of millions of dollars of attorney's fees that
have funded further citizen suit enforcement actions." Richard Lazarus, Rise and Demise of the
Citizen Suit, 15 ENvTL. F. 8 (1998).
11. A combination of increased monitoring requirements (mandated by the federal
Compliance Assurance Monitoring regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,900 (1997) [hereinafter CAM
Regulations], expansion of the type of data or information that can constitute credible evidence
of a federal Clean Air Act violation (the Credible Evidence Revisions, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,900
(1997) [hereinafter ACE Rule]) and requirement that certain facilities obtain much more
detailed air permits (required by the Title V of the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7661-
7661 (E)(1994)) is the reason for the prediction. See Wright & Henry, supra note 4, at 303-18,
328-33. A general discussion of Clean Air Act citizen suits is found in Wright & Henry, supra
note 4, at 328-33.
12. A discussion of several citizen suits that originated in Arkansas is found in Wright &
Henry, supra note 4, at 402-04.
13. One commentator argues that the governmental environmental requirements are more
complex than the tax code. See Ronnie P. Hawks, Comment, Environmental Self-Audit
Privilege and Immunity: Aid to Enforcement or Polluter Protection?, 30 ARIz. ST. L.J. 235
(1998).
14. "An average of six hundred pages of environmental statutes and rules have been
enacted and/or promulgated every year since 1972. See id.
15. A National Law Journal survey of corporate counsel found that two-thirds believed
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(and seeking to avoid enforcement) have over the past ten years increasingly
considered a liability avoidance technique known as environmental auditing.
16
Environmental auditing or environmental compliance auditing has been
defined in various ways, but a straightforward description articulated by the
federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in 1986 states:
Environmental auditing is a systematic, documented, periodic and
objective review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices
related to meeting environmental requirements."
One objective of the environmental compliance audit is to identify and
correct violations of applicable state and federal environmental regulatory
requirements at a facility prior to discovery by a governmental agency or
that their companies had violated governmental environmental requirements within the
preceding twelve months and only thirty percent believed full compliance is possible. See
Marianne Lavelle, Survey: General Counsel Face Environmental Toll, NAT'L L.J. (1992), at
S2 (cited in Hawks, supra note 16).
16. An extensive number of articles have addressed environmental auditing techniques
and/or the various issues associated with these activities. See, e.g., Michael Ray Harris,
Promoting Corporate Self-Compliance: An Examination of the Debate Over Legal Protection
for Environmental Audits, 23 ECOLOGY L. Q. 713 (1996); Donald A. Carr & William L.
Thomas, Devising a Compliance Strategy Under the ISO 14000 International Environmental
Management Standards, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 86-87 (1997); James M. Weaver, et al., State
Environmental Audit Laws Advance Goals of Cleaner Environment, 11 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENv'T 9 (1997); Dara B. Less, Incentives for Self-Policing: The Need for a Rule, 2 ENVTL.
LAW. 773 (1996); David Sorenson, The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Recent
Environmental Auditing Policy and Potential Conflicts with State-Created Environmental Audit
Privilege Laws, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 505 (1996); Lisa Koven, The Environmental Self-Audit
Evidentiary Privilege, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1190 (1998); Miri Berlin, Environmental Auditing:
Entering the Eco-Information Highway, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 637 (1998); Brooks M. Beard,
The New Environmental Federalism: Can The EPA's Voluntary Audit Policy Survive?, 17 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 27 (1997); David A. Danna, The Perverse Incentive of Environmental Audit
Immunity, 81 IOWA L. REV. 976 (1996); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation: The Dangerous Journey From Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.
165 (1998); Kirk F. Marty, Moving Beyond the Body Count and Toward Compliance:
Legislative Options for Encouraging Environmental Self-Analysis, 20 VT. L. REV. 499-500
(1995); Terrell E. Hunt & Timothy A. Wilkins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement Policy,
16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 365 (1992).
17. Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004, at 25,006 (1986)
[hereinafter Policy Statement]. Arkansas defines an environmental audit as:
[A] voluntary, internal, and comprehensive evaluation of one (1) or more facilities
or an activity at one (1) or more facilities regulated under this chapter, or federal,
regional, or local counterparts or extensions thereof, or of management systems
related to that facility or activity, that is designed to identify and prevent
noncompliance and to improve compliance with statutory or regulatory
requirements.
1995 Ark. Acts 350 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-301-312 (Supp. 1997)) [hereinafter
Act 350].
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citizen suit plaintiff.' The audit might consider all relevant governmental
environmental requirements or focus on one statute and the corresponding
regulations.' 9
Governmental environmental enforcement agencies have recognized for
some time that audits can be beneficial. 2' The federal Environmental
18. Environmental audits are often undertaken for a variety of other reasons. A witness
at a 1997 United States Senate Hearing listed:
Assess and reduce environmental health and safety risks, both as required by
regulation and on a voluntary basis that goes beyond compliance.
Anticipate upcoming regulatory requirements (which enables facilities to manage
pollution control in a proactive manner).
Prioritize pollution prevention activities.
Help management understand new regulatory requirements and establish corporate
policies.
Assess internal management and control systems.
Measure progress toward compliance.
Improve expeditious communication regarding environmental developments to
facility personnel and, where appropriate, ensure effective communication with
government agencies and the public.
Assure that capable and properly trained personnel are available at all times to
perform emergency and other environmental functions.
Evaluate causes for environmental incidents and determine procedures to avoid
recurrence.
Assure sufficient budgeting for environmental concerns.
Provide a means for employee training and performance evaluation.
Maximize resources through recycling, waste minimization, and other pollution
prevention measures, including process changes, that may benefit the environment.
Fulfill various other obligations, such as providing appropriate disclosure to other
agencies (e.g., the SEC), and evaluating the environmental aspects of corporate or
real property transactions.
Environmental Audits: Hearing Before the Senate Environment and Public Works Comm.,
105'h Cong. 93 (1997) [hereinafter Environmental Audits Hearing] (Statement of Paul G.
Wallach, Esq., Hale & Dorr, on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers and the
Corporate Environmental Enforcement Counsel).
19. An audit will often consider first whether there are environmental governmental
requirements applicable to the facility that it has failed to recognize. For example, it may
determine that one of its processes or activities causes a discharge of a "pollutant" through a
"point source" into "navigable waters" therefore requiring the acquisition of a federal Clean
Water Act National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. Section 301
of the Clean Water Act imposes this permitting requirement. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(a). The
terms "pollutant," "point source" and "navigable waters" are broadly defined. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(6)-(7),(14). Arkansas has been delegated and administers this program pursuant to
ADPC&E Reg. Nos. 2 and 6. Second, assuming the required permit has already been obtained,
the audit will focus on whether the facility is in compliance with this document's various
effluent limitations and other requirements. Other requirements may include activities such as
mandated sampling and monitoring of the effluent (i.e. facility wastewater). See 40 C.F.R. §
122.44(i). These sampling/monitoring results are subsequently provided to the relevant
governmental agency in a document often titled Discharge Monitoring Reports ("DMRs"). See
id.
20. EPA's original 1986 policy statement supported the use of audits. See Policy
1999]
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Protection Agency ("EPA") and Department of Justice ("DOJ") have in fact
developed written policies that allow the mitigation of penalties or exercise of
enforcement discretion in the event such compliance promotion programs are
successfully implemented. 2' Likewise, Arkansas 2 and a number of states have
enacted legislation designed to encourage this activity.
23
One reason for the federal and state agency interest in rewarding or
encouraging such audits is the realization that the governmental agencies do
not currently and are never likely to have the enforcement resources to
effectively monitor the hundreds of thousands of regulated facilities.24
Therefore, the idea of companies voluntarily25 periodically monitoring or
Statement 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,004. The DOJ has stated: "Self-auditing and other forms of self-
policing can play a crucial role in promoting environmentally sound business practices." Letter
to Steven Herman, Esq., Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance
Assurance, U.S. EPA, from Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural
Resources Division, U.S. DOJ (Jan. 31, 1996).
21. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995) [hereinafter Incentives]; U.S. Department of Justice,
Factors and Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental Violations in the Context
ofSignificant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts (July 1, 1991) [hereinafter Factors].
The DOJ's policy provides that a vigorous voluntary compliance program can serve as a
mitigating factor in the event criminal investigation is initiated against a company. See id. at
10-11.
22. The Arkansas environmental statutory privilege was enacted in 1995. See 1995 Ark.
Acts 350. As a practical matter Act 350 and its provisions are generally more important to
Arkansas facilities than the federal audit and/or enforcement policies since the ADPC&E has
been delegated the authority to operate and enforce substantially all of the various programs
(air, water, hazardous waste, underground storage tanks, etc.). See Wright & Henry, supra note
4, at 234. Nevertheless, the federal government maintains it has the authority to file an
enforcement action even in delegated states. Such an action is known as "overfiling."
Overfiling was examined in a 1997 United States Senate Environment and Public Works
hearing. See Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Hearing Before Committee on Environment
and Public Works, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter Environmental Enforcement Hearing]. Note
that a federal district court recently ruled that EPA does not have the authority under the federal
Solid Waste Disposal Act to pursue a civil action against a facility that settled various violations
with a delegated state. See Harmon Industries v. Browner, W.D. Mo., No. 97-0832-CV-W-3
(Aug. 25, 1998). The Harmon litigation was examined in the previously cited 1997
Congressional hearing. See Environmental Enforcement Hearing, at 52 (Statement of Robert
G. Harmon, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Harmon Industries, Inc.).
23. A very detailed examination of many of the state audit privilege statutes enacted to
date is provided in Stensvaag, The Fine Print of State Environmental Audit Privileges, 16
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 69 (1998).
24. One author noted in regard to the rationale for record keeping for regulated facilities:
"A key premise driving environmental protection is that government resources and personnel
are limited so sources must keep accurate records of their emissions." Phillip Weinberg, "If It
Ain't Broke..." We Don't Need Another Privileges and Immunities Clause for Environmental
Audits, 22 J. CORP. L. 643 (1997).
25. By way of clarification, not all environmental audits are undertaken "voluntarily."
Federal EPA actions are often resolved pursuant to consent or settlement agreements. These
agreements sometimes include a commitment on the part of the alleged violator to audit all or
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assessing their facilities and correcting identified noncompliance is deemed a
welcome supplement to the traditional enforcement scheme.26
Environmental compliance audits are not without risk. One of the key
concerns related to their use is that they are by design intended to assess a
facility's compliance status with respect to relevant federal and/or state
environmental regulatory programs. In other words, their objective is to
identify potential violations. Further, audit results are typically discussed or
documented at the end of the investigation or review. Many companies and
facilities fear that whether conveyed orally or in writing, the audit results might
be disclosed27 or acquired by governmental agencies or other parties.2"
a portion of one or multiple facilities in regard to compliance with a single or all relevant
federal environmental regulatory programs. See generally Policy Statement 51 Fed. Reg. at
25,006. The document also typically requires that the facility agree to remedy the violations
identified during the audit. An example is a document denominated "Consent Agreement and
Consent Order the EPA Region VI Office" entered into with a Texas trucking company to
address underground storage tank regulatory program violations. See In re Merchants Fast
Motor Lines, Inc., Docket #UST 6-95-101-AO-1 (March 4, 1996). This document required that
the company audit several of its facilities in regard to environmental noncompliance and remedy
any violations. The company was also required to undertake a pollution prevention assessment
whibh included an analysis of the wastes generated and activities responsible for such
generation along with identification of potential facility changes to reduce the volume and
toxicity of such wastes. This combined work constituted what the federal EPA and some states
denominate a Supplemental Environmental Project ("SEP"). SEPs are projects or actions
performed by regulated parties in exchange for a reduction in penalties. The federal criteria for
approval of SEPs were recently revised. See 63 Fed. Reg. 24,796 (1998). SEPs or in-kind
payments are also sometimes utilized to settle Arkansas enforcement actions. A total of
$1,673,141 in SEPs were obtained by ADPC&E enforcement efforts in 1997-98. See
Memorandum from David F. Kern, Legal Management Project Analyst II, ADPC&E, to Randall
Mathis, Director, ADPC&E, Updated Enforcement Chart & Graph (Dec. 15, 1997). The 1998
federal SEP policy expresses a preference for projects involving pollution prevention
techniques. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 24,798. For a discussion of both the federal and Arkansas SEP
policies see Wright & Henry supra note 4, at 322-28 and 400-02. The ADPC&E has also
included in some of its Consent Administrative Orders ("CAO") a mandate to identify (i.e.
audit) and correct violations. A CAO is a settlement document that the ADPC&E typically uses
to resolves an enforcement action. These ADPC&E activities are discussed in Section Ill(B),
infra, of this Article.
26. Not included are activities already mandated by a facility's permit or a federal or state
regulation requiring sampling, testing or monitoring. They are not "voluntarily" undertaken.
For example, the federal air program requires some facilities to monitor or sample air emissions
at a plant on a periodic or continuous basis and report the results to the agency. See generally
CAM Regulations, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,900 (1992). Another example might be the discovery of
the release of a "reportable quantity" of hazardous substances at a facility. Section 103(a) of
the Comprehensive Response, Compensation and Liability Act would require the "persons in
charge" of the facility to report this release as soon as they learn of them. See 42 U.S.C. §
9603(a). The EPA has promulgated regulations which defines what constitutes a reportable
quantity for various hazardous substances. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4. The quantity is based on
how much of the relevant hazardous substance was released within a 24 hour period. See 40
C.F.R. § 302.6.
27. Two authors contrast financial auditing with environmental audits by stating: "In
1999]
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Concerns regarding potential consequences of disclosure require companies to
consider whether the benefits of an audit outweigh the risks.29
Such information or data could be damaging to a facility defending
against a governmental enforcement action, federal citizen suit and/or a third
party lawsuit alleging property damage, bodily injury, etc. For example, a
facility investigating whether it is operating within the terms of its air permit
or the corresponding regulations may generate a report with information
indicating it is out of compliance. A party pursuing a federal Clean Air Act
citizen suit action against the facility may be able to use this information to
help prove a violation. Similarly, a facility voluntarily investigating the type
addition, unlike the case of the results of financial audits, even public companies often regard
environmental data obtained through an internal audit as non-public information." George Van
Cleve & Keith W. Holman, Promise and Reality in the Enforcement of the Amended Clean Air
Act I: Federal Enforceability and Environmental Auditing, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10151, 10158
(1997).
28. A related risk is that by definition company or facility management are provided
knowledge of the existence of violations of federal environmental programs. The federal and
some state environmental statutes provide that criminal penalties may be imposed in certain
circumstances in the case of knowing violations. See Andrew J. Turner, Mens Rea in
Environmental Crime Prosecutions: Ignoratia Juris and the White Collar Criminal, 23 COL.
J. OF ENVTL. L. 217 (1998). Once such violations are identified facility management may have
been provided "knowledge" of the violations. Consequently, the failure to address such
noncompliance risks the imposition of criminal penalties. Company or facility management
should therefore be prepared prior to undertaking the audit to remedy any violation that is
discovered. One early commentator opined it may be unwise for a company to undertake an
environmental audit if it does not intend to act on the results. See Phillip Reed, Environmental
Audits and Confidentiality: Can What You Know Hurt You As Much As What You Don't
Know?, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10303 (1983).
29. One author states:
All of this hoopla about the confidentiality of audit documents has made many
companies nervous about the auditing process. At some, the auditing function has
been frozen in place, cut back, or tied more closely to the general counsel's office.
Worried managers and counsel have scaled back the scope or nature of audits out
of a concern that the potential enforcement risk generated by the audit may be
greater than the enforcement risk that the audits are attempting to prevent.
David J. Hayes, 13 ENVTL. F. 18, 20 (1996). However, EPA policies purport to restrict the
circumstances in which such information can be acquired and the extent of its use at the state
and federal levels is a subject of debate. See generally Susan J. Spicer, Turning Environmental
Litigation on its EAR: The Effects of Recent State Initiatives Encouraging Environmental
Audits, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 50 (1997).
30. A court addressed this scenario in Unitek Environmental Services v. Hawaiian Cement,
27 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,483 (D. Haw. 1993). Documents analyzing the plants' compliance status
were deemed credible evidence that could be considered. The use of such data, studies, or
audits voluntarily generated or otherwise to prove noncompliance has become much more of
a concern in the federal Clean Air Act area because of the 1997 promulgation of the "Any
Credible Evidence" Rule. See ACE Rule, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,900 (1997). The ACE Rule states
EPA's belief that various types of data such as engineering calculations, indirect estimates of
emissions, and direct measurement of emissions by a variety of methods can be used to
determine compliance. Two commentators note:
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and extent of subsurface (i.e. residing in the soil and/or groundwater)
contaminants on its property incurs the risk that an adjacent landowner could
use such data in a third party common law action for damages in the event of
alleged migration across boundary lines.
While some of the information generated by an environmental audit may
trigger state or federal reporting requirements," more often it probably does
not. For example, if petroleum (i.e. regulated substances)32 is discovered
adjacent to an underground storage tank, regulations implementing Subtitle I
of the federal Solid Waste Disposal Act require that this fact be reported to the
relevant government agency within twenty-four hours.33 In contrast, a facility
that determines during an audit that drums of hazardous waste are mislabeled
Under the rule, EPA may now use 'any credible evidence' to prove violations under
the Clean Air Act. Prior to this rule, EPA was limited to the use of performance
tests, such as stack tests, to prove that a company violated the Act. The practical
effect of the Credible Evidence Rule is that EPA may now use a broader array of
information to prove noncompliance with the Clean Air Act. By expanding the
types of evidence that EPA can use to prove violations under the Clean Air Act,
EPA has potentially raised the stakes for companies considering undertaking
compliance audits. Indeed, compliance audits are exactly the type of evidence at
which the Credible Evidence Rule appears to be aimed. The Credible Evidence
Rule potentially increases the incentives for EPA to seek out audit results which
document noncompliance with the Clean Air Act. As a practical matter, there has
been no indication that EPA has sought out such audit results. However, at a
minimum, the Credible Evidence Rule creates yet one more uncertainty for entities
considering undertaking a compliance audit.
Douglas P. McLeod & Kirk F. Merty, Can You Afford to Perform an Environmental Audit?,
Presentation at the Air & Waste Management Association's 91st Annual Meeting (June 1998).
In fact, environmental organizations expressed concern that their gains in information disclosure
provided by various environmental programs would be undermined by state legislation
protecting audit information. See Beard, supra note 16. The actual motive is deemed to be
prevention of audits being used in citizen suits and common law actions. See Harris, supra note
16. Some groups also believe "bad" actors will escape responsibility for their actions while
those who complied in the first place are not rewarded. .See id. For a discussion of Clean Air
Act citizen suits, see Wright & Henry, supra note 4, at 328-33. The ACE Rule is discussed in
the same article at pages 313-18.
31. See Arnold W. Reitze & Lee D. Hoffman, Self-Reporting and Self-Monitoring
Requirements Under Environmental Laws, 1 ENVTL. LAW. 681 (1995); James R. Arnold,
Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities to Government Agencies and Third Parties, CA47 ALI-
ABA 381 (1995); and Arnold W. Reitze & Steve Schell, Reporting Requirements for
Nonroutine Hazardous Pollutant Releases Under Federal Environmental Laws, 5 ENVTL. LAW.
1 (1998). These articles provide a comprehensive discussion of the myriad of federal
environmental statutory and regulatory reporting requirements.
32. The federal and Arkansas underground storage tank regulations are applicable to
underground storage tanks that contain "regulated substances." See 40 C.F.R. § 280.12. The
term regulated substances includes "petroleum." See id.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 6991(a); 40 C.F.R. § 280.50. Arkansas incorporates by reference the
federal underground storage tank regulations in ADPC&E Reg. No. 12. A variety of
underground storage tank issues are discussed in Wright & Henry, supra note 1.
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in violation of the Subtitle C regulations of the federal Solid Waste Disposal
Act arguably does not have an obligation to report this to the governmental
agency.' Of course, even if a discovered condition or deficiency is not subject
to a reporting requirement, facilities sometimes deem it in their best interest to
provide such information to the government in an attempt to resolve the matter
and/or obtain penalty mitigation as provided by the previously cited federal
EPA voluntary reporting policy.35 Nevertheless, some companies have in the
past and continue to be reluctant to voluntarily generate environmental audit
information which might be obtained by governmental agencies or other
parties. 3
6
34. ADPC&E Reg. No. 23,262.31 requires that generators of hazardous waste place labels
containing certain information on the containers holding these substances. In some situations
the requirement to report is unclear. Consider for example an audit that finds that greater
quantities of hazardous waste were generated at a facility than originally believed. This
discrepancy does not necessarily need to be reported to a governmental agency. Nevertheless,
ADPC&E Reg. No. 23 requires that an annual report be provided to the agency listing the
amounts of each type of hazardous waste generated during the previous calendar year. See
ADPC&E Reg. No. 23, 40 C.F.R. 262.24. There is perhaps an implied obligation upon
discovery of this inaccuracy to submit a corrected annual report. A discussion of ADPC&E
Reg. No. 23 and the corresponding federal regulations is found in Allan Gates, Does Arkansas
(Or Anyone Else) Have a Valid Mixture or Derived-From Rule?, 15 U. ARK. LITTLE RocK L.J.
697 (1993); Steve Weaver, The "Mixture" and "Derived-From " Rules Are Alive and Well in
Arkansas, 15 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 713 (1993); Mary Ellen Henry, Note, Retroactive
Vacature of the Mixture and Derived-From Rules Under RCRA, United v. Goodner Bros.
Aircraft, Inc., 15 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 727 (1993). An overview of recent hazardous
waste regulatory and judicial developments is provided by Mary Ellen Henry & Walter G.
Wright, Jr., Hazardous Waste: 1998 Regulatory and Judicial Developments, Presentation at the
Air & Waste Management Association's 91st Annual Meeting (June 1998).
35. See Incentives, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995). Some companies recognize that whether
what is discovered is an environmental condition (i.e. soil contamination) or regulatory
violation a risk exists that a subsequent government inspection will reveal the issue. Therefore,
regardless of whether the condition or deficiency must be reported, companies sometimes
decide that a federal or state governmental agency may be more inclined to refrain from
instituting enforcement if a report is voluntarily and promptly submitted. The theoretical
additional benefit to the company is that an internal contingent liability is resolved. However,
there is always a risk that regardless of the voluntary disclosure the government agency will
undertake enforcement and/or mandate that the environmental condition be addressed. The
cited EPA policy is an attempt to address this concern at the federal level.
36. For an early article discussing the potential risks related to environmental compliance
audits see James W. Moorman & Laurence S. Kirsch, Environmental Compliance Assessments:
Why Do Them, How To Do Them and How Not To Do Them, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 97
(1991). Despite the perceived risks, EPA cites a Price Waterhouse survey for the proposition
that environmental auditing is practiced by 75% of the corporations surveyed. See The Federal-
State Relationship: A Look Into EPA Regulatory Efforts: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Commerce, 105th Cong. 56 (1996)
[hereinafter Federal-State Hearings] (written statement of Steven A. Herman, Assistant
Administrator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. EPA).
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While both the federal EPA and DOJ have policies in place to encourage
performance of environmental audits, neither guarantee that their respective
agencies will not attempt to obtain these documents and use them in an
enforcement action.37 Regardless, citizen plaintiffs would not be bound by an
EPA or DOJ decision not to seek to obtain or use the environmental audit.
Substantial attention has therefore been devoted in the past to the potential use
of the attorney/client, work product and/or self-evaluation privileges to
maintain the confidentiality of audit documents." The perceived inadequacies
or practical problems related to the use of these three common law doctrines
triggered an effort beginning several years ago to enact statutory privileges at
the federal and state level to better ensure the maintenance of the confidential-
ity of environmental audits. Both EPA and DOJ have opposed the creation of
such a statutory privilege39 and to date Congress has failed to enact one at the
federal level.' °
37. See generally Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004 (1986); Incentives, 60 Fed. Reg.
66,706 (1995). The DOJ stated in part in a 1996 letter to EPA the following in regards to this
issue:
The Department generally will not seek an environmental audit from a regulated
entity prior to receipt of other information suggesting that the entity has committed
violations of environmental law. However, once an investigation is begun on the
basis of independent information of violations, the Department seeks all relevant
information, including audit reports.
Letter to Steven Herman from Lois J. Schiffer, supra note 20.
38. See generally Moorman & Kirsch, supra note 36.
39. See Environmental Audits Hearing, supra note 18, at 49-55 (statement of Steven A.
Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of Environmental Compliance Assurance, U.S. EPA).
The national environmental groups also generally oppose environmental audit statutory
privileges at the federal and state level. See Environmental Audits Hearing, supra note 18, at
106 (statement of Mark Woodall, Chair Legislative Committee, Sierra Club, Georgia Chapter).
A list of environmental and public interest groups opposing such state legislation was provided
in EPA's written statement at this hearing. See Environmental Audits Hearing, supra note 18,
at 58-59 (statement of Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance, U.S. EPA). See also David Roland, The Case Against an
Environmental Audit Privilege, NATIONAL ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 3 (Sept. 1994). One
commentator expressed concern that state variances in enforcement (as opposed to uniform
federal standards) could result in local governments using these differences to attract industry.
See Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "To
the Bottom?," 48 HASTINGS L.J. (1997).
40. In the legislative history of the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act Congress
attempted to encourage environmental audits by stating:
Nothing in subsection 113(c) is intended to discourage owners or operators of
sources subject to this Act from conducting self-evaluations or self-audits and acting
to correct any problems identified. On the contrary, the environmental benefits from
such review and prompt corrective action are substantial and section 113 should be
read to encourage self-evaluation and self-audits.
Owners and operators of sources are in the best position to identify
deficiencies and correct them, and should be encouraged to adopt procedures where
internal compliance audits are performed and management is informed. Such
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The experience at the state level has been different. A number of states,
including Arkansas, have developed statutory privileges for environmental
compliance audits."' While the regulated community has been supportive of
such state efforts,42 these privileges have been a source of tension with the
EPA.43 The EPA has communicated its desire to various states, including
internal audits will improve the owners' and operators' ability to identify and correct
problems before, rather than after, government inspections and other enforcement
actions are needed.
The criminal penalties available under subsection 113(c) should not be
applied in a situation where a person, acting in good faith, promptly reports the
results of an audit and promptly acts to correct any deviation. Knowledge gained
by an individual solely in conducting an audit or while attempting to correct any
deficiencies identified in the audit or the audit report itself should not ordinarily
form the basis of the intent which results in criminal penalties.
Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference for the Clean Air Act 1990
Amendments, 136 Cong. 13,101 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7679 (1994).
41. Two commentators report that as of 1998 twenty states have enacted such legislation.
See McLeod & Merty, supra note 30. Various versions of such legislation are found in Alaska,
Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Virginia and Wyoming. See McLeod & Merty, supra note 30.
42. See Federal-State Hearings, supra note 36, at 22-26 (written statement of Samuel Z.
Chamberlain, II, Director of Environmental Affairs, Sterling Chemicals, Inc.).
43. Colorado's Attorney General testified in a 1998 Congressional hearing in regard to
that state's audit legislation:
As you know, EPA is trying to eviscerate these laws in all states that have them.
EPA has used two tactics recently to discourage use of these laws and to force the
repeal or amendment of these laws.
First, EPA is thwarting state initiatives in the audit area by discouraging
companies from using audit laws. EPA has successfully done this by taking actions,
or threatening action, which appears to retaliate against companies that use the
provisions of the audit law. These actions include overfilings and burdensome
requests for information.
For example, in Colorado, several entities that have used the immunity
provisions of the state law-including one public entity, the Denver Water
Board---received letters from EPA requesting information about violations
voluntarily disclosed to the state. Further, EPA has threatened to overfile in those
cases. I understand that EPA has, in fact, overfiled against companies utilizing self-
audit laws in other states.
This campaign of intimidation obviously discourages use of state self-audit
laws. Any company that comes forward under a state law knows that it is giving
EPA a blueprint for a federal enforcement action. EPA has thus practically nullified
state audit laws, even in states that have not yet buckled to EPA's pressure by
actually amending or repealing the laws. In Colorado, we believe EPA's
intimidating tactics explain why only twenty-five entities, out of thousands of
business facilities in Colorado, have used the law.
Id. at 52 (written statement of Hon. Gale A. Norton, Colorado Attorney General). EPA's
objection to these privileges was stated in part as follows:
Regarding state audit laws, we recognize that states may find different ways to
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Arkansas, that changes be made to these privilege statutes.' EPA has indicated
encourage companies to voluntarily discover, disclose, and correct environmental
violations. But, at the same time, we are concerned that some of the approaches
being taken actually can allow polluters to keep secret from the public critical
information about potential threats to health and the environment, and can obstruct
the ability of the states and the public to hold the regulated community accountable
by maintaining and utilizing an adequate enforcement program.
Let me be clear that we have two distinct issues regarding State audit
laws--one of policy and one of law. On the policy level, we oppose all State audit
privilege and immunity laws in any form. Both EPA and DOJ have repeatedly
testified before Congress and State legislatures that audit privileges make it more
difficult to enforce the nation's environmental laws by making it easier to shield
evidence of wrongdoing. A privilege law invites defendants to claim many types
of evidence relevant to a violation as privileged, including sampling data and
information concerning the cause of and possible environmental contamination
resulting from a violation. A privilege could, consequently, breed litigation and
waste government resources as both parties struggle to determine what materials fell
within the protected scope of the audit. Furthermore, a 1995 study by Price
Waterhouse of 369 businesses entitled The Voluntary Environmental Audit Survey
of US. Business indicated that a privilege is not needed to encourage voluntary
compliance.
Ultimately, an audit privilege invites secrecy and breeds distrust with the
community thereby undermining the kind of openness that builds trust between
regulators, the regulated community, and the public necessary for the regulated
community to be able to effectively police itself. We also oppose blanket
immunities as a matter of policy, because, among other things, they can eliminate
the important deterrent effect of penalties and result in disparate treatment of
companies in States with different immunity laws.
The second issue we have with these audit laws is legal. Under Federal law,
EPA has to ensure that the States retain certain minimum enforcement authorities
required by Federal law for program approval, delegation, and authorization. More
specifically, EPA must assure that a State audit immunity law does not deprive a
State of its authority to obtain injunctive relief and civil and criminal penalties for
any violation of program requirements. In determining whether these requirements
are met, EPA is particularly concerned with whether a State has the authority to: (1)
obtain immediate and complete injunctive relief; (2) recover civil penalties for
significant economic benefit, repeat violations and violations of judicial or
administrative orders, serious harm, and activities that may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment; and (3) obtain criminal fines and sanctions for willful and
knowing violations of Federal law.
Environmental Enforcement Hearing, supra note 22, at 160 (statement of Steven A. Herman,
Assistant Administrator, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. EPA). See
also Weinberg, supra note 24, for an argument that state privilege is an unnecessary incentive
for the regulated community to undertake audits. EPA also spelled out its reasons for opposing
such state legislation in its promulgation of its more recent audit policy. See Incentives, 60 Fed.
Reg. at 66,710. See also Koven, supra note 16.
44. See Letter from Jerry Clifford, Acting Regional Administrator, EPA, to Randall
Mathis, Director, ADPC&E (September 15, 1997) (addressing Arkansas operation of Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act). Disagreements between the states and EPA are not limited
to statutory audit privileges. For example, EPA and Arkansas have recently clashed over the
appropriate enforcement procedures in regards to air program violations. See Memorandum
from Bennie S. Salem, Divisional Inspector General, Office of Inspector General, EPA, to Jerry
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that such changes must be made to avoid jeopardizing the state's ability to
maintain and/or obtain delegation of a particular program.45 In turn, some
members of Congress have been critical of EPA's disagreements with the states
on these issues.46 Several Congressional hearings have focused on these
tensions and the continuing interest in enacting a federal privilege statute.47
A related issue involves a number of companies' efforts to implement
environmental management systems. As the country moves toward the year
2000, various companies, including many in Arkansas, will feel increasing
pressure to adopt international standards including environmental management
and auditing systems if they wish to compete in the global marketplace.
Through the use of environmental management systems, companies like Apple
Computer, Colgate-Palmolive, Anheuser-Busch, and the Coca-Cola Company
are reexamining their production processes and discovering more efficient
ways to reduce costs and improve their products and services.49 A related
Clifford, Acting Regional Administrator, EPA Region VI, Region VI's Oversight of Arkansas
Enforcement Data (Audit Report Number EIFAF7-06-0014-7100295) (Sept. 26, 1997)
(Inspector General's view of adequacy of ADPC&E efforts to identify and institute enforcement
actions against significant CAA violators); Letter to Bennie S. Salem, Divisional Inspector
General, Office of Inspector General, EPA, from Steve Weaver, Policy Advisor to the Director,
ADPC&E, Arkansas Response to Draft Report Issued by the U.S.E.P.A. Office of Inspector
General (Sept. 12, 1997) (ADPC&E criticism of previously cited Inspector General Report).
A discussion of this issue is found in Wright & Henry, supra note 4, at 394-98.
45. See Wright & Henry, supra note 4, at 394-98. The Colorado Attorney General noted:
EPA's second tactic has been to threaten to revoke the delegated environmental
programs from any state that has a self-audit law not to EPA's liking. Revoking the
delegated programs basically means EPA would take over enforcement of the Clean
Air Act, Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and
thus not let the states administer programs under these statutes. EPA's threat of
revocation has worked in many states. States including Michigan, Texas and Idaho
have simply backed down in the face of EPA pressure.
Federal-State Hearings, supra note 36, at 52 (written statement of Hon. Gale A. Norton,
Colorado Attorney General).
46. Congress has held three recent hearings that have focused in part on environmental
audits and the federal/state disagreements regarding statutory privileges. See Environmental
Enforcement Hearing, supra note 23; Federal-State Hearings, supra note 36; Environmental
Audits Hearing, supra note 18. The senatorial critics of EPA's policy on this issue include
Senator Tim Hutchinson of Arkansas. See Environmental Audits Hearing, supra note 18, at 20
(statement of Honorable Tim Hutchinson).
47. See Environmental Enforcement Hearing, supra note 22; Federal-State Hearings, supra
note 36; Environmental Audits Hearing, supra note 18. Despite the existence of an audit
privilege statute in a given state the enactment of a federal provision is deemed important by
some because of the EPA and DOJ position that it does not curtail their federal authority to
obtain such documents. In other words, would the Arkansas privilege statute shield audits
requested by EPA or DOJ using their federal statutory enforcement authorities?
48. See generally Harris, supra note 16.
49. See generally Carr & Thomas, supra note 16.
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endeavor that potentially provides both cost savings through reduction of waste
disposal costs and reduction of liability risk is a pollution prevention audit.
Part I of this Article has introduced the concept of environmental
compliance auditing and the rationale for this activity.50 Part II briefly
addresses the common law techniques sometimes used to attempt to maintain
their confidentiality. Because of the common law privileges' legal and
practical inadequacies, the Arkansas effort to provide limited statutory
protection for these documents is discussed in Part III. The changes to the
Arkansas statute that may result because of EPA's objections will be consid-
ered. To put the Arkansas statute in context, Part IV provides a brief historical
review of EPA's audit policies. The relationship between compliance auditing
and pollution prevention will be explored in Part V. A discussion of one
Arkansas manufacturing facility's pollution prevention efforts will also be
examined. Finally, the limited incentives available to promote pollution
prevention will be discussed in Section VI.
11. COMMON LAW PRIVILEGES
Three common law privileges are potentially available to maintain the
confidentiality of an audit depending on the jurisdiction and the circumstances
involved in its development.
A. Attorney Client Privilege
Arkansas Rule of Evidence 502(b) states "a client has a privilege to refuse
to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential
communications made for he purpose of facilitating the rendition of profes-
sional legal services to the client (1) between himself... and his lawyer...
The Arkansas Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the privilege is
50. This article will not address the important role environmental audits or "assessments"
often play in commercial transactions involving improved or unimproved properties. Those
transactions might include the sale/purchase, leasing or financing of such properties. Of course,
there is some overlap between the two types of audits since the transactional assessment would
typically consider compliance status in the case of improved properties (i.e. active facilities).
However, a transactional assessment would be more likely to focus on the potential existence
of contamination at the property or facility (in the soil, groundwater, etc.) than a compliance
audit. The assessment will play a role in determining both the value of the facility and the
prospective lessee's or purchaser's ability to undertake a particular use in the future. A seller
or lessor might, however, use an assessment to set a "baseline" of the environmental conditions
existing at the time of the transfer of the facility. Transactional environmental assessments are
addressed in Walter G. Wright, Jr., The Seasons They Are a Changin': An Update on
Management of Environmental Issues Related to Commercial Transactions, ARK. LAW. 8
(Autumn 1993).
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"designed to secure subjective freedom of mind for the client in seeking legal
advice."'
No Arkansas cases have examined the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege to an environmental audit. Other jurisdictions addressing this
question apply the formalities of the privilege rather strictly. In In re Grand
Jury Matter,52 a Pennsylvania District Court was faced with the question of
whether a party could lawfully assert the attorney-client privilege and ignore
a subpoena requesting waste handling records. The defendant in the matter
claimed that the subpoena should be quashed because their attorney had hired
a consultant to aid in compliance assurance. The court rejected this contention,
instead finding that the communications must concern legal advice and could
not be merely in the realm of consulting services.5 3 Instrumental in the
decision was a finding that the consultant was working more directly for the
company than the attorney.54
More recently, a New York District Court further restricted the applicabil-
ity of the attorney-client privilege in the environmental context. In United
States Postal Service v. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp., the court refused to
allow a company to invoke the attorney client privilege in respect to documents
created by an engineering firm hired to do environmental studies.
Several courts have found the attorney-client privilege to exist for
documents created by an environmental consultant. In Arizona ex rel. Corbin
56v. Ybarra, a corporate attorney retained a consultant to investigate possible
violations of the state Hazardous Waste Management Act. The court found
that under these circumstances, the consultant was part of the attorney's
investigative staff and the report prepared following the investigation was for
internal use and subject to the attorney-client privilege. Also, in Olen
Properties Corp. v. Sheldahl, Inc.57 a court determined an environmental audit
51. See Arkansas Nat'l Bank v. Cleburne County Bank, 258 Ark. 329, 331, 525 S.W.2d
82 (1975). One court stated that the privilege can be invoked: (1) Where legal advice of any
kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his
instance permanently protected, (7) from disclosure by himself or the legal advisor, (8) except
the protection be waived. See United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983)
(citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292).
52. 147 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
53. See id. at 85.
54. In 1989 a federal district court rejected the application of the attorney-client privilege
because the company failed to demonstrate its in-house counsel was acting in a legal capacity.
See United States v. Chevron, No. CIV-88-6681, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12267, at *17 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 16, 1989).
55. 852 F. Supp. 156 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
56. 777 P.2d 686 (Ariz. 1989).
57. No. CV 91-646-WDK, 1994 WL 212135, at *20 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 1993).
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was prepared so as to obtain legal advice and therefore protected by the
attorney client privilege.5"
B. Self-Critical Analysis Privilege
A few jurisdictions have found that confidentiality is provided by a "self-
critical analysis" privilege. In Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc.,59 a
Florida District court found that a self-critical analysis privilege existed for
environmental audits unless the party opposing the privilege could show
extraordinary circumstances or need. A federal district court in Georgia
applying that state's common law found that documents or files prepared by a
company to evaluate its compliance with environmental laws were encom-
passed by a self-critical analysis privilege. 60 The court in United States v.
Dexter6 found that this privilege would obstruct enforcement and disallowed
its use.
Even jurisdictions that recognize the privilege significantly restrict its
applicability. Further, a federal district court in Arkansas has stated that the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals does not recognize the self-critical analysis
privilege.62 The Court noted that the audit contained the only information
58. Certain procedures may enhance the possibility of the applicability of a privilege.
Two authors suggest the following if an outside environmental consultant is retained to conduct
an audit:
The consultant should report directly to counsel for purposes of protecting the
information gathered as privileged, and to control the type of record being
assembled. All draft and final reports should be submitted to outside counsel for
review and distribution. Distribution of such reports should be limited within the
company on a need-to-know basis, and confidential materials should be labeled and
segregated from nonprivileged materials.
Mary Ellen Kris & Gail L. Vannelli, Today's Criminal Environmental Enforcement Program:
Why You May be Vulnerable and Why You Should Guard Against Prosecution Through an
Environmental Audit, 16 COL. J. OF ENVTL. L. at 248 (1991).
59. 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994). See also CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co., 620 A.2d 462 (N.J. 1992), which found a privilege. The self-critical analysis
privilege is also recognized in a variety of other consulting contexts. See generally Tharp v.
Sivyer Steel Corp., 149 F.R.D. 177 (S.D. Iowa 1993); Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 53
F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).
60. See Joiner v. Hercules, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 695, 698-99 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
61. 132 F.R.D. 8,9-10 (D. Conn. 1990).
62. See Carr v. El Dorado Chemical Co., No. 96-1081, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5752
(W.D. Ark. April 14, 1997). The Court addressed a motion to compel production of an
environmental audit In the opinion the Court summarized the restrictions to this privilege as:
[1] [T]he privilege typically extends only to subjective impressions and opinions
contained in a written report, not objective facts (citing Webb v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1978)).
[2] [T]he privilege makes sense only when the protected information 'must be of a
type whose flow would be curtailed if discovery was allowed' (quoting Dowling v.
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about the facility's releases and pattems/practices.63 It believed that access to
the data was necessary to assess a continuing risk from those releases to
plaintiffs and the public."
C. Work-Product Privilege
The attorney work product exception provides slightly different protection
than the attorney-client privilege. The Arkansas Supreme Court has stated that
"[w]ork product is not the same as a privilege that protects the sanctity of
confidential communications; the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product rule the principles upon which they are based, while susceptible
to confusion, are separate and distinct., 65 The federal rule governing attorney
work product states:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative... only upon a showing that the party seeking
discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the
party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."
American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423,425-26 (9th Cir. 1992)).
[3] [T]he privilege arguably may not apply when the materials are relevant to the
investigation of a federal regulatory agency (citing Federal Trade Commission v.
TRW, Inc., 620 F.2d 207, 210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
[4] '[N]o material should be privileged unless it was prepared with the expectation
that it would be kept confidential, and has in fact been kept confidential' (quoting
Dowling, 971 F.2d at 426).
Id. See also LEAN Inc. v. Evans Industries, Inc., 43 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1170 (E.D. La.
1996). The Court disallowed self-evaluation privilege in part because it was not convinced that
environmental audits were always performed with the understanding that they would remain
confidential.
63. See id. at 25.
64. See id. This decision is one of several discussed in a 1998 United States House of
Representatives hearing. See Federal-State Hearing supra note 36 at 154-55. (U.S. EPA
response to Commerce Committee questions).
65. Parker v. Southern Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 326 Ark. 1073, 935 S.W.2d 556 (1996).
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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Issues frequently arise as to what is "in anticipation of litigation."67 The
work product rule might not provide protection for audits that are prepared for
compliance assurance and not in contemplation of imminent litigation.
Questions regarding the applicability of these privileges to environmental
audits and the previously described risks related to their disclosure have been
one reason for the interest in enacting the Arkansas and other states' statutory
privileges. There is also a practical reason for seeking a confidentiality
mechanism other than the common law privileges.68 To stay within the
common law privileges the audit process has to be supervised by an attorney.69
This might be an expensive and/or awkward arrangement.7°
Ill. ARKANSAS ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING DEVELOPMENTS
A. The Arkansas Environmental Audit Privilege Statute
1. Legislative History
In 1995, the Arkansas General Assembly addressed the regulated
industries' concerns regarding the adverse consequences that full, unfettered
admission of self-compliance audits would have on self-monitoring.7" In Act
67. See Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1977). In an
unrelated context, the EPA itself asserted both the attorney client and work product privileges
in a successful attempt to prevent disclosure under the federal Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, et seq., of various documents it generated related to four Michigan
Superfund sites. See Chemcentral/Grand Rapids Corporation v. United States Environmental
Protection Agency, No. 91-C-4380, 1992 WL 281322, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1992). The
Comprehensive Response Compensation and Liability Act or "Superfund" is found at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601 et seq. In Chemcentral the court found that various EPA documents fit within either the
attorney client or work product privileges and therefore met the deliberative process exemption
of the FOIA. This exemption protects communications between federal agencies and outside
consultants or other persons whose opinions or recommendations are part of the agency's own
deliberative process. See Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Dept. of Justice, 917 F.2d 571, 574-75
(D.C. Cir. 1990). In addressing the work product privilege the Chemcentral court found that
the documents at issue did not simply involve collecting background information regarding the
four Michigan Superfund sites. The court also cited the fact that the EPA office labeled the
documents "Enforcement Confidential" or "Attorney Client Privileged."
68. For a discussion of the practical considerations involved in maintaining the
confidentiality of audits under common-law privileges see David R. Erickson & Sarah D.
Matthews, Environmental Compliance Audits: Analysis of Current Law, Federal Policy
Considerations to Best Protect Their Confidentiality, 63 UMKC L. REV. 491, 521-24 (1995).
69. See Hawks, supra note 13, at 242.
70. See Hawks, supra note 13, at 242.
71. Governor Jim Guy Tucker signed Act 350 on February 17, 1995. See
ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS (Ark. Envtl. Federation) 1 (March/April 1995). See also D. Keith
Fortner, Environmental Law Survey, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 327, 335 (1996). Both
industrial and some state environmentalists endorsed the legislation. See Seth Blomeley, State
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350 of 1995, the legislature found "that the protection of the environment is
enhanced by the public's voluntary compliance with environmental laws and
that the public will benefit from incentives to identify and remedy
environmental compliance issues."
2. Summary of the Arkansas Environmental Audit Privilege Statute
Act 35072 provides a means of encouraging self-auditing by creating a
limited protection against disclosure of potentially adverse information
contained in the evaluation. The statute allows a facility73 to conduct a
Risks $3 Million Loss as Law Stands, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Aug. 31, 1998, at 7A. The
environmental groups originally supporting the legislation included Arkansans for
Environmental Reform and the Arkansas Sierra Club.
72. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-301 etseq. (Michie 1997).
73. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-303(a) describes the scope of the privilege:
In order to encourage owners and operators of facilities and persons conducting
other activities regulated under this chapter, or its federal counterparts or extensions,
both to conduct voluntary internal environmental audits of their compliance
programs and management systems and to access and improve compliance with
statutory and regulatory requirements, an environmental audit privilege is created
to protect the confidentiality of communications relating to voluntary internal
environmental audits.
Id. One commentator has expressed confusion as to who can invoke the Arkansas privilege.
See Stensvagg, supra note 23, at 93-94. Stensvagg states:
The Arkansas legislature has enacted somewhat confusing language concerning the
actors who may invoke the environmental audit privilege. On the one hand, the
portion of the statute expressly creating the privilege states that it is designed to
encourage "owners and operators of facilities and persons conducting activities
regulated under this chapter, or its federal counterparts or extensions" to engage
in auditing. The portion of the statute defining "environmental audit," on the other
hand, provides that a privileged audit must involve an evalutation of a facility (or
an activity at a facility) "regulated under this chapter, or federal, regional, or local
counterparts or extensions thereof." Arguably, the broader language used in
defining "environmental audit" should prevail. If so, this means that the qualifying
audits may be performed at facilities and for activities regulated under regional or
local counterparts (or extensions) of the pertinent federal and state laws.
Who are the actors cross-referenced in this manner? They include, first,
persons conducting activities regulated under "this chapter" of the Arkansas Code.
It is at least questionable, however, that the legislature meant the cross-reference to
be this narrow. Chapter 1 ("General Provisions") of the Arkansas Code Title 8
("Environmental Law")-the chapter in which the environmental audit privilege is
codified-consists of three subchapters: (1) provisions setting up a system of permit
issuance fees and authorizing inspections; (2) provisions setting forth additional
powers of the Arkansas Department of Pollution Control and Ecology and the
Arkansas Pollution Control and Ecology Commission; and (3) the environmental
audit privilege. If the audit privilege extended literally to only those facilities and
persons whose activities were regulated under those subchapters, it might protect
very few actors and, more importantly, might serve as a trap to unsuspecting
companies.
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voluntary "environmental audit" 74 report which is privileged, provided the
statutory provisions are followed. The "environmental audit report" is the set
of documents developed as a result of the audit and it must be marked
"ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT REPORT: PRIVILEGED DOCUMENT."'75
The term environmental audit report is broadly defined to include:
1. Field notes, records of observations, findings, opinions, suggestions,
conclusions, drafts, memoranda, drawings, photographs, computer-
generated or electronically recorded information, maps, charts, graphs, and
surveys collected or developed for the primary purpose of preparing an
environmental audit;76
2. An audit report prepared by the auditor that includes: (a.) the scope
of the audit; (b.) the information gained in the audit; (c.) conclusions and
recommendations; (d.) exhibits and appendices; 77
3. Memoranda and documents analyzing a portion of or all of the audit
report and discussing implementation issues; and78
4. An implementation plan that addresses correcting past compliance,
improving current compliance, and preventing future noncompliance.79
What the legislature most likely meant to say was "facilities and persons
conducting... activities under this title"--meaning Title 8 of the Arkansas Code.
Other chapters in Title 8 cover such things as environmental testing, water and air
pollution, water pollution control facilities, solid waste, and hazardous wastes.
Given the logic of the environmental audit privilege, it may well be that the
legislature intended to refer to persons regulated under these statutory programs, or
under any 'federal, regional, or local counterparts or extensions' of these statutes.
Id.
74. "Environmental Audit" is defined in ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-302(3)(A) (Supp. 1997)
as:
[A] voluntary internal, and comprehensive evaluation of one (1) or more
facilities or an activity at one (1) or more facilities regulated under this
chapter, or federal, regional, or local counterparts or extensions thereof, or of
management systems related to that facility or activity, that is designed to identify
and prevent noncompliance and to improve compliance with statutory or regulatory
requirements.
Id.
75. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-302(4) (Supp. 1997).
76. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-302(4)(A) (Supp. 1997). The potentially protected material
clearly encompasses a number of documents in addition to the actual audit report itself. It is
therefore important for facilities to recognize that as information (i.e. sampling data, etc.) or
documents (i.e. employee interviews, etc.) are initially generated the required statutory
procedures to provide them confidentiality should be followed to ensure protection for these
materials. See id.
77. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-302(4)(B) (Michie 1997).
78. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-302(4)(C) (Michie 1997).
79. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-302(4)(D) (Michie 1997).
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The audit privilege is intended to make the report inadmissible in criminal,
civil, or administrative actions, including enforcement actions.80 However, the
extent of the privilege is limited and can be waived under a variety of
circumstances. 8' The privilege similarly does not apply to "[d]ocuments,
communications, data, reports, or other information that must be collected,
developed, maintained, reported, or otherwise made available to a regulatory
agency[.] ' '82 In a legal action, parties may stipulate as to the admissibility or
80. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-303(b) (Michie 1997). One author in an article critical of
state audit privilege statutes references the Arkansas provision and states:
Finally, privilege statutes will impose barriers not just to government enforcement
of environmental laws, but to citizen suits and tort litigation as well. For example,
the Arkansas statute typically provides that 'an environmental audit report shall be
privileged and shall not be admissible as evidence in any civil, criminal or
administrative legal action.'
Weinberg, supra note 24, at 653-54.
81. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-304 (Michie 1997) provides the following situations in
which waiver of the privilege may be found:
(a) The privilege described in § 8-1-303 does not apply to the extent that:
(1) It is waived expressly by the owner or operator of the facility that
prepared or caused to be prepared the environmental audit report;
(2) The owner or operator of a facility or person conducting an activity seeks
to introduce an environmental audit report as evidence;
(3) The owner or operator of a facility authorizes the disclosure of the
environmental audit report to any party, except where:
(A) Disclosure is made under the terms of a confidentiality agreement
between the owner or operator of a facility and:
(i) A potential purchaser of the facility; or
(ii) A customer, lending institution, or insurance company with an existing
or proposed relationship with the facility; or
(B) Disclosure is made under the terms of a confidentiality agreement
between government officials and the owner or operator of a facility; or
(C) Disclosure is made to an independent contractor retained by the owner
or operator of the facility for the purpose of identifying noncompliance with
statutory or regulatory requirements and assisting the owner or operator in achieving
compliance with reasonable diligence.
(b) The waiver of the privilege described in § 8-1-303 may be for part or all of the
environmental audit report and said waiver of privilege extends only to that part of
the environmental audit report expressly waived by the owner or operator of a
facility.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-304 (Michie 1997). The expansion of Act 350 to potential purchasers
and lenders is presumably intended to ensure that an audit or assessment performed in a
transactional context (proposed sale or loan) would be protected even as it is inevitably
provided to the other parties in the commercial transaction.
82. ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-305 (Michie 1997). For example, a facility required by its
NPDES water discharge permit to periodically sample its effluent (i.e. wastewater) and submit
discharge monitoring reports to the ADPC&E could not retain these results as privileged under
this program. ADPC&E Reg. No. 6 addresses the NPDES permit requirements and associated
sampling/reporting provisions. These sampling and reporting requirements are found in part
in 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(i).
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nonadmissibility of information contained in the report.8 3 Disclosure of the
audit report may also be appropriate in a civil action when it is shown that the
privilege was fraudulently asserted, the material was not subject to the
privilege, or the report shows a violation of state or federal law or regulation
of almost any kind; and the person asserting the privilege did not "promptly
initiate and pursue appropriate efforts to achieve compliance with reasonable
diligence."' The privilege will be disregarded in criminal matters on the same
grounds.85 In either civil or criminal actions, noncompliance will not be found
for failure to obtain a permit, provided the person filed an application for a
permit not more than ninety days after becoming aware of the noncompliance."
The audit privilege statute provides a means by which a prosecuting
authority may obtain a copy of the audit report.87 The prosecuting authority
must have information that was obtained from a source independent of the
audit report that indicates a probable cause to believe that a violation has
occurred.8  The seizure of the report may be accomplished by warrant,
subpoena, or through discovery. 89 Within thirty (30) days after the seizure, the
person who caused the report to be created may file with the prosecuting
tribunal a petition requesting a hearing on the admissibility of parts of the
report or the report as a whole. 9° Once the tribunal has received the petition,
it must set an in camera hearing within forty-five (45) days to determine the
admissibility of the part of the report or the document as a whole.9 ' The burden
of proof of establishing the validity of the privilege is borne by the party
asserting the privilege.92
The Arkansas audit privilege was addressed by a court for the first time
in Carr v. El Dorado Chemical Co.93 In Carr, the plaintiffs filed a motion to
compel production of two documents relating to problems with the defendant's
wastewater treatment system.94 The defendant inadvertently produced a
83. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-305 (Michie 1997).
84. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-307 (Michie 1997). The requirement to remedy
noncompliance is arguably another non-enforcement mechanism that motivates companies or
facilities to expeditiously eliminate violations.
85. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-308 (Michie 1997).
86. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-307(b)(1), 308(b)(1) (Michie 1997).
87. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-309 (Michie 1997).
88. See id. § 8-1-309(a)(1).
89. See id. § 8-1-309(a)(2).
90. See id. § 8-1-309(b).
91. See id. § 8-1-309(c).
92. See id.
93. See Carr v. El Dorado Chem. Co., No. 96-1081, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5752 (W.D.
Ark., April 14, 1997).
94. See id. at *2.
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portion of the first document that was requested.9" The plaintiffs then requested
that the court review, in camera, both documents that had originally been
requested to determine if they were privileged in whole or in part.96 The
request subsequently became moot when it was determined that what was
thought to be only a part of the document was actually the whole document.97
The defendant refused to disclose the second document asserting that "an
environmental audit conducted by Monsanto relating to the defendant, El
Dorado Chemical Company facility, is privileged communication and protected
from disclosure by virtue of the Arkansas statutory environmental audit
privilege... and the common law critical self-analysis privilege."98 The statute
was enacted in 1995 while the document in question was contained in a March
29, 1993 memorandum. 99 The issue before the court was whether the intent of
the Arkansas General Assembly, in creating this limited privilege, was for it to
retroactively apply to documents created prior to the enactment of the statute.
The court examined the statute's stated purpose and found no evidence of a
legislative intent to apply the privilege retroactively. The court also found it
persuasive that the audit "could not have been performed in reliance upon the
fact that it would not be subject to discovery."'
3. Potential Changes
The Arkansas privilege statute has become a source of disagreement
between the EPA and ADPC&E.' ' The EPA has asked the ADPC&E to revise
Act 350 in three ways "to assure that the ADPC&E retains the requisite
authorities for RCRA102 program authorization":
1. [M]ake the privilege created by the Audit Law inapplicable to
criminal violations and proceedings;
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. at *3. The court disposed of the "self-critical analysis privilege" by pointing
to the fact that the Eighth Circuit does not recognize such a privilege. See id. The absence of
such a privilege further illustrates the need for the Arkansas Environmental Audit Privilege.
99. See Carr, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5752, at *6.
100. Id. at *7.
101. Note that the national environmental groups have threatened legal action against EPA
if it delegates federal authority to states with expansive privilege legislation. See Beard, supra
note 16. Those groups would argue that such audit privileges hinder enforcement. See Beard,
supra note 16.
102. "RCRA" refers to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (otherwise known as
the federal Solid Waste Disposal Act,) 42 U.S.C. § 6901 etseq. which regulates the generation,
transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous wastes. The Arkansas regulations
implementing this statute are found in ADPC&E Reg. No. 23.
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2. [C]larify that the public's right of access to compliance information
is not weakened by the Audit Law°3;
3. [C]larify that the Audit Law will not circumvent RCRA's require-
ments concerning permitting and interim status."°
In response to this request, a draft ADPC&E bill was produced for
consideration by the state legislature when the Arkansas General Assembly
convenes in 1999.105 This proposed Act would repeal the sections of the statute
allowing the application of the privilege in criminal matters.° 6 The act would
also repeal other subsections referring to the privilege in a criminal matter.° 7
A representative of ADPC&E has stated that EPA's request will have little
effect upon industry within the state due to the fact that the agency's policy is
to cooperate with industry to assure compliance before assessing fines. 0
B. ADPC&E Audit Practices
The federal government refuses to guarantee that it will not attempt to
acquire and use an audit in certain circumstances.'09 In contrast, the Arkansas
General Assembly has obviously by statute decreed that audits will not be
103. Hawks, supra note 13, at 259.
104. See Letter from Jerry Clifford, Acting Regional Administrator, EPA, to Randall
Mathis, Director, ADPC&E (Sep. 15, 1997). See also Blomeley, supra note 71. State statutory
audit privilege issues have not arisen solely in the RCRA delegation process. For example,
EPA Region VI's approval of the Texas Title V program has involved revisions of that state's
audit legislation. See E.G. Fiesinger, Title V Operating Permits in Texas: The Saga Continues,
Presentation at the Air & Waste Management Association's 91st Annual Meeting (June 1998)
(examining the Texas CAA Title V program and the role its audit legislation has played in the
delegation process).
105. See Act To Repeal The Applicability Of Environmental Audit Privilege To Criminal
Actions, 1999 Regular Session (proposed) (on file with authors). EPA is extending the time
period ADPC&E has to make these revisions until the General Assembly meets in January,
1999. See Telephone Interview with Mike Bates, Chief, Hazardous Waste Division, ADPC&E
(Oct. 2, 1998). See also Blomeley, supra note 71, at 7A.
106. See Act To Repeal The Applicability Of Environmental Audit Privilege To Criminal
Actions, 1999 Regular Session (proposed) (on file with authors).
107. See id. Based on an ongoing discussion between EPA and ADPC&E it is believed that
these amendments would address the concerns identified in the previously cited September 15,
1997 letter from EPA to ADPC&E. See Telephone Interview with Mike Bates, supra note 105.
Note, however, the amendments do not address EPA's requirement to clarify the public's right
of access to informaiton and the effect on RCRA permitting and interim status.
108. See Blomeley, supra note 71, at 7A (quoting Al Eckert, Chief of the ADPC&E Legal
Division).
109. See Incentives, 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,708 (EPA states that it will not routinely request
audits).
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available to the ADPC&E or other parties unless one of the exceptions is
applicable."10
The ADPC&E has utilized audits as an additional tool to facilitate
compliance. It frequently incorporates audit requirements in its settlement
documents (i.e. Consent Administrative Orders ["CAOs"]) used to resolve
enforcement actions."' Such provisions are most often incorporated into the
CAOs settling Arkansas Hazardous Waste Management Act" 2 or Arkansas
Water & Air Pollution Control Act' enforcement actions if the ADPC&E
believes that the facility would benefit from an audit."' For example, if the
facility was not inspected regularly, or was newly regulated, it may not be fully
aware of the applicable regulatory requirements. At such a facility ADPC&E
believes a compliance audit may serve to provide a "report card" of its
compliance status with regard to the applicable regulations." 5 Facilities that
are inspected periodically, particularly those that have been regulated for many
years, are assumed to be aware of their compliance status, and not as likely to
benefit from such an audit." 6 In such cases, the ADPC&E would be less likely
110. Arkansas' experience to date has not demonstrated an increase in voluntary disclosure
of violations by the regulated community. See Interview with Randall Mathis, Director,
ADPC&E (June 22, 1998). However, this may not be surprising since unlike either EPA's
voluntary disclosure policy or a few other state programs, Arkansas does not provide for
immunity from enforcement. See Incentives, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995). Colorado's
voluntary disclosure/immunity program is described in Federal-State Hearings, supra note 36,
at 52 (testimony of Hon. Gale A. Norton, Colorado Attorney General). Also, the lack of
voluntary disclosures to the agencies does not mean facilities are not increasingly auditing and
correcting violations in view of the confidentiality protection provided by Act 350.
111. See Telephone Interview with Nelson Jackson, Attorney, Legal Division, ADPC&E
(Sept. 29, 1998); Telephone Interview with David Brown, Hazardous Waste Division,
ADPC&E (Sept. 29, 1998). The audit mandates placed in ADPC&E CAOs are not always
focused on a search for non-compliance. For example, see In re El Dorado Chem. Co., LIS 95-
070 (May 4, 1995) in which that facility agreed to undertake subsurface monitoring and under
certain circumstances a waste minimization assessment. Also, either EPA or ADPC&E might
negotiate a SEP in a consent order in which the alleged violator agrees to implement pollution
controls or mandates that exceed the actual regulatory requirements. The DOJ and a Fort Smith,
Arkansas manufacturing facility entered into a 1996 consent decree that required in part that air
emission controls be installed that exceeded existing governmental standards. See United States
v. GNB Industrial Battery Company, Inc., Consent Decree, 96-2129 (W.D. Ark. 1996).
112. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-201. This program is implemented through Reg. No. 23
by the ADPC&E Hazardous Waste Division.
113. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-3-101 et seq. This program is implemented through Reg.
Nos. 18, 19 & 26 by the ADPC&E Air Division. See generally Wright & Henry, supra note
4.
114. See Interview with Nelson Jackson, supra note 111; Interview with David Brown,
supra note 111.
115. See Interview with Nelson Jackson, supra note 111; Interview with David Brown,
supra note 111.
116. See Interview with Nelson Jackson, supra note 111; Interview with David Brown,
supra note 111.
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to negotiate an audit requirement in the CAO. However, the ADPC&E
believes that even facilities that have been regulated for some time would
benefit from a compliance audit requirement if a significant regulatory
requirement was consistently ignored or there was a failure in matters such as
record keeping." 7
If an audit requirement is included in a CAO, a time frame for its
completion is specified." 8 Also, the ADPC&E requires the simultaneous
submission of a report describing the measures taken by the facility to correct
the instances of identified noncompliance." 9 The results of these mandated
audits will not be used as a basis for additional enforcement. 2 ° Depending
upon the circumstance, the ADPC&E may address discovered instances of
noncompliance by incorporating additional remedial requirements into a
modification of the original CAO. In the alternative, the ADPC&E may simply
require that the instances of noncompliance be corrected.' 2 ' The decision to
initiate an action is within ADPC&E's enforcement discretion. Further, the
ADPC&E might use an audit in a future enforcement action if the report
prepared by the facility was subsequently proven to be erroneous or
fraudulent.1
22
Some audits simply result from a governmental inspection as opposed to
a specific request or mandate. For example, a facility may feel pressured after
a substandard inspection to further investigate the identified deficiencies.' 23
Facilities that find it necessary to determine their compliance status through an
audit are often uncomfortable with their degree of understanding of the
applicable governmental requirements. 24 This may be particularly important
117. See Interview with Nelson Jackson, supra note 111; Interview with David Brown,
supra note 111. For example, sometimes an ADPC&E Air Division inspection discovers air
emission sources at a facility that should have been included in an air permit. See Interview
with Nelson Jackson, supra note 11. The ADPC&E may therefore deem it appropriate to have
the facility determine through an audit whether there are other sources of emissions that should
be included in an air permit.
118. See Interview with Nelson Jackson, supra note 11; Interview with David Brown,
supra note I11.
119. See Interview with Nelson Jackson, supra note 111; Interview with David Brown,
supra note 111.
120. See Interview with Nelson Jackson, supra note 111; Interview with David Brown,
supra note 111.
121. See Interview with Nelson Jackson, supra note 111; Interview with David Brown,
supra note 111.
122. See Interview with Nelson Jackson, supra note 111; Interview with David Brown,
supra note 111.
123. See Telephone Interview with Thomas P. Jones, Vice-President, Pollution
Management, Inc. (Oct. 1, 1998).
124. See id.
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if the facility is subject to a new environmental regulatory program. 25 Similar
considerations are applicable if an existing regulatory program is modified.
1 26
125. For example, a number of facilities are in the process of acquiring much more detailed
and complex air permits as required by the CAA Title V program. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-
7661(f). The regulations implementing the Title V program in Arkansas are found in Reg. No.
26. The complexity of the new permits has motivated some facilities to assess whether the
emission limits and other Title V conditions are achievable through "dry runs" or other
exercises prior to their actual imposition. For a description of the Title V program, see Wright
& Henry, supra note 4, at 303-08 and 386-91.
126. Federal and state regulations are revised periodically for a variety of reasons. Recent
examples in Arkansas are the proposed revisions to two key regulations (ADPC&E Reg. Nos.
18 & 19) that in part implement the CAA in Arkansas. The Arkansas air quality program
underwent fundamental changes beginning in August, 1998. The regulatory scheme set up by
the ADPC&E Reg. No. 18 (the "Arkansas Air Code") and ADPC&E Reg. No. 19 (State
Implementation Plan ["SIP"] Regulations) were products of two years of negotiations with
industry. Several provisions of these two regulations were rejected by EPA on August 25,
1998. See Letter from Robert E. Hannesschlager, P.E., Acting Director, Multimedia Planning
and Permitting Division, U.S. EPA, Region VI, to Randall Mathis, Director, Arkansas
Department of Pollution Control & Ecology (Aug. 25, 1998) (on file with the ADPC&E).
ADPC&E Reg. Nos. 18 and 19 were extensively revised on July 1, 1997. The relevant
revision to Reg. No. 19 was submitted to EPA as a proposed CAA SIP revision shortly
thereafter. The 1997 Reg. No. 19 applied only to "major sources" of federally regulated air
pollutants ("FRAP"), i.e., sources emitting over 100 tons per year ("tpy") of any one FRAP, 25
tpy of any combination of hazardous air pollutants ("HAPs"), or 10 tpy of any one HAP. Reg.
No. 18 addressed all sources emitting less than these amounts of FRAPs or HAPs, or emitting
any other amount of a state regulated pollutant, and allowed some sources to operate pursuant
to an "Air Pollution Prevention Plan" ("APPP") rather than an air permit. Reg. No. 19 also
provided for self-implementing minor modification provisions. However it did not contain
opacity limitations. With its August 1998 letter, the EPA rejected the 1997 proposed SIP
revisions, stating that they violated Section 1 10(a)(2)(C) of the CAA, as well as regulations
codified pursuant thereto (40 C.F.R. §§ 51.160-163) that require minor new source review
pursuant to a state's SIP. The EPA also rejected Arkansas' minor modification procedures
along with the deletion of opacity requirements. The EPA noted that minor modifications
required action by the ADPC&E and that opacity must be included in the SIP as a surrogate for
meeting the National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") for particulates.
In response to the EPA's August 15, 1998 letter and SIP denial, the ADPC&E issued
proposed revisions to Reg. Nos. 18 and 19, in September, 1998. The proposed revisions
eliminated the major versus minor source distinction between Reg. Nos. 18 and 19. Assuming
these proposed regulations are eventually adopted, Reg. No. 19 would apply to sources emitting
much lower emission rates, for example, 40 tpy of carbon monoxide, 25 tpy of either nitrogen
oxide, sulfur oxide, volatile organic compounds, or 15 tpy of particulate matter. The revisions
also propose to remove the self-implementing minor modification procedure from Reg. No. 19
and reinstate the opacity requirement. Reg. No. 18 would no longer provides for APPPs, but
allows sources emitting less than the Reg. No. 19 thresholds to potentially escape permitting
altogether. See Wright & Henry, supra note 4, at 368-83 (providing a detailed discussion of
Reg. Nos. 18 and 19 prior to the proposed revisions). This is a classic example of program
changes that will force many companies to reassess the requirements applicable to their facilities
and obligations related thereto. For example, some facility operations may no longer be exempt
from the requirement to obtain an air permit.
These proposed revisions to Reg. No 19 were approved by the EPA with comments by
letter dated November 20, 1998. See Letter from Jole C. Luehrs, Chief Air Permits Section,
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Finally, employee downsizing may occasionally motivate a company to
undertake an audit. 127 The environmental manager position may have been
eliminated, forcing a non-environmental professional such as a shipping
manager or human relations specialist to assume responsibility for environmen-
tal compliance. 2' In cases where there is a lack of depth in knowledge of the
applicable regulations, the facility will sometimes hire an outside consultant to
conduct an audit. 1
29
IV. FEDERAL AUDIT POLICY
A. EPAIDOJ
To put the Arkansas statutory audit privilege in context it is helpful to
understand the history of federal environmental auditing policies. The EPA
issued its first policy addressing environmental audits on November 8, 1985.'30
This first policy initiative was released as an interim guidance. It listed the
elements of effective environmental auditing13 1 with an intent of enhancing its
effectiveness. The comments received on the interim guidance dealt primarily
U.S. EPA, Region VI, to Keith Michaels, Chief, Air Division, Arkansas Department of
Pollution Control and Ecology (Nov. 20, 1998). Specifically, the EPA stated that the Arkansas
Audit Privilege Statute must not apply to construction which occurs prior to issuance of a
permit required to Regulation 19 because Regulation 19 requires pre-construction permits. See
id. at 2-3. Additionally, the EPA stated that the Arkansas Environmental Variances Act, 1995
Ark. Acts 943, must not be interpreted to allow a temporary variance of interim authority to
construct a source subject to Regulation 19, again because Regulation 19 requires pre-
construction permits. See id., at 3. A full discussion of the Arkansas Environmental Variances
Act is contained in Wright & Henry, supra, note 4, at 345-47.
127. See Telephone Interview with Thomas P. Jones, supra note 123.
128. See Telephone Interview with Thomas P. Jones, supra note 123. Corporate
downsizing is a common reason for a facility's noncompliance. Even if an employee had
original responsibility for these issues he or she may have taken on additional areas of
responsibility. Environmental regulations are complicated and voluminous. It may be difficult
to effectively ensure environmental compliance on a part-time basis depending on the scope of
requirements applicable to a given facility. See id.
129. See Telephone Interview with Thomas P. Jones, supra note 123.
130. See Environmental Audit Policy Statement, 50 Fed. Reg. 46,504 (1985). For
additional historical perspective, see "Current Practices in Environmental Auditing," EPA
Report No. EPA-230-09-83-006, February 1984; "Annotated Bibliography on Environmental
Auditing," Fifth Edition, September 1985; Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,007.
131. In both the interim guidance and final policy, EPA drew heavily from "Compendium
of Audit Standards" (1983, Walter Willbom, American Society for Quality Control) and
"Standards from the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing" (198 1, The Institute of Internal
Auditors, Inc.). See Buck J. Wynne & C. Gregory Rogers, Corporate Environmental
Compliance Management: Federal Government Benchmarks, presented at the ABA SONREEL
October 1, 1993 First Annual Meeting in Asheville, North Carolina.
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with possible EPA requests for audit reports and concern that the agency would
use these documents for environmental compliance 'witch hunts.' 1
32
The EPA's final policy, released on July 9, 1986, did not differ signifi-
cantly from the interim guidance. The EPA's cited objectives in releasing this
final policy included helping to initiate auditing activities by providing a model
for acceptable programs, identifying the criteria considered important, assisting
regulatory agencies in their negotiation of CAO provisions addressing
environmental auditing, and to guide states and localities considering auditing
initiatives. 13 3 The EPA identified the following important elements of an
auditing system: (1) top management support; (2) independent auditing
function; (3) adequate staffing and training; (4) explicit objectives, scope,
resources, and frequency; (5) a process sufficient to collect the necessary
information to achieve objective; (6) specific procedures for developing reports
of audit findings, corrective actions, and schedules for compliance; (7) quality
assurance procedures.1
34
With regard to requests for audit reports, the EPA incorporated into its
final policy some additional clarification in response to comments requesting
delineation of specific circumstances where the agency may request audit
reports.135 However, the EPA maintained that audit reports, or at least the
relevant portion(s), would be requested if they were necessary for an investiga-
tion, i.e., if the information could not be attained through monitoring, or other
data sources. 36 The EPA declined to incorporate any positive incentives,
stating that "the 'incentives' most frequently mentioned in this context are
fraught with legal and political obstacles."'
137
The DOJ issued its first policy addressing environmental audits five years
later on July 1, 1991.138 This 1991 policy was similar to the EPA's 1986 policy
with regard to when DOJ would ask for copies of audit reports. 39 Both the
DOJ and the EPA's policies encouraged voluntary auditing and provided some
132. -See Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,007.
133. See Wynne & Rogers, supra note 131, at 10.
134. See Wynne & Rogers, supra note 131, at 11-14.
135. See Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,007.
136. See id. at 25,007.
137. See id. at 25,007.
138. See U.S. Department of Justice, Factors and Decisons on Criminal Prosecutions for
Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure
Efforts (July 1, 1991).
139. Audit reports would not be requested unless they were necessary for an investigation.
See Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,007 ("EPA's authority to request an audit report, or
relevant portions thereof, will be exercised on a case-by-case basis where the Agency
determines it is needed to accomplish a statutory mission, or where the government deems its
to be material to a criminal investigation."). See also Letter to Steven Herman from Lois J.
Schiffer, supra note 20.
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recognition of facilities' auditing efforts in enforcement activities. However,
both policies also maintained that audit reports may be used in civil enforce-
ment actions or criminal prosecutions. Thus, audit reports would not be
requested unless they were necessary for an investigation.
These federal policies arguably did not facilitate voluntary compliance
audits. Therefore, the EPA explored different approaches. In 1994, the EPA
published a notice in the Federal Register seeking facilities to participate in
"Pilot Project Proposals" in which the agency would reassess facilities'
environmental audit procedures. 40 Then, on June 20, 1994, the EPA noticed
two-day public meetings scheduled for July 1994, Washington, D.C., and
January, 1995, in San Francisco, to discuss its "environmental auditing policy
and related environmental compliance self-evaluation and disclosure issues.'
141
The EPA invited stakeholders from industry, trade groups, state environmental
commissioners, and attorneys general, district attorneys, public interest
organizations and professional environmental auditors. 42 During the hearings,
several groups opposing confidentiality for voluntary environmental compli-
ance audit reports argued it amounted to "corporate concealment rights."'
' 43
Following the July hearings, the EPA published a restatement of policies
related to environmental audits on July 28, 1994.'4 In its restatement, the
agency announced its intent to "encourage the private sector to collect data and
survey auditing practices in order to gauge the effect of enforcement policies
on self-evaluation and disclosure."' 145 The EPA subsequently published another
interim policy on April 3, 1995.'" With this interim policy, the EPA provided
federal civil penalty mitigation if several conditions and limitations were met.
Public response focused on the fact that the EPA limited application of the
penalty mitigation to violations that were "voluntarily" reported.' 47 It was
argued that many conditions and deficiencies were already subject to
140. Grants and Cooperative Agreements; availability, etc. See Environmental Leadership
Program: Request for Pilot Project Proposals, 59 Fed. Reg. 32,062, 32,063 (1994) (public
notice).
141. See Meeting: Environmental Audit Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 31,914 (1994) (public notice).
142. See Incentives, 60 Fed. Reg. at 66,706.
143. See David Rubenstein, Organizations Fight for Confidentiality of Self-Audits, CORP.
LEGAL TIMEs, March 1995, at 20.
144. See Restatement of Policies Related to Environmental Auditing, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,455,
38,456 (1994).
145. Id.
146. See Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy
Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875 (1995).
147. See id. at 16,877.
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mandatory reporting, 4 ' and were often discovered by means other than audits,
such as normal monitoring and record keeping.'49
The EPA published its final policy statement regarding voluntary
environmental compliance auditing on December 22, 1995.150 In this long-
awaited final guidance, the EPA maintained its position with regard to
voluntary reporting pursuant to a qualifying environmental audit. 5 ' However,
for qualifying violations, the EPA provided the following incentives for
reporting the instances of non-compliance: (1) no gravity-based penalties or
reduction of gravity-based penalties by 75%; (2) no criminal recommendations;
(3) no routine request for audit reports.'52
Qualification was predicated on meeting nine qualifying conditions.
These nine are: (1) systematic discovery; (2) voluntary discovery; (3) prompt
disclosure; (4) discovery and disclosure independent of government or third-
party plaintiff; (5) correction and remediation; (6) prevent recurrence; (7) no
repeat violations; (8) other violations excluded; (9) cooperation.
The first and second condition, systematic and voluntary discovery,
require that the discovery of the instance of non-compliance must be pursuant
to a qualifying environmental audit, i.e., an objective, documented, systematic
procedure or practice reflecting regulated entity's due diligence in preventing,
detecting, and correcting violations. 5 3 The key, of course, is whether the audit
and subsequent reporting is actually voluntary. To ensure that the audit and
discovery of the violation is voluntary, the EPA requires that the violation must
be identified and disclosed apart from any mandated sampling or monitoring.
The third condition, prompt reporting, requires reporting of the violation
in writing within ten days of discovery. The fourth condition, independent
discovery and disclosure, requires disclosure prior to: commencement of a
federal, state or local inspection/investigation; notice of a citizen suit; filing of
a complaint by third party; reporting of the violation to the EPA by a "whistle
blower" employee; or imminent discovery of the violation by a regulatory
agency. With this fourth condition, the EPA ensures that the facility is
148. See Reitze & Hoffiman, supra note 31; Reitze & Schell, supra note 31, for a discussion
of the various federal reporting requirements.
149. See James T. Banks, EPA's New Enforcement Policy: At Last, a Reliable Roadmap
to Civil Penalty Mitigation for Self-Disclosed Violations, 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (ENvTL. L. INST.)
10227, 10230 (1996).
150. See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention
of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995).
151. The EPA remains opposed to audit privileges because one of the rationales behind the
policy statement was the movement of states toward incentive programs. See Dara B. Less,
Incentives for Self-Policing: The Need For a Rule, 2 ENVT. LAW 773 (1996).
152. See id. at 761-62.
153. See id. at 762.
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rewarded for taking the initiative, and not for attempting to simply escape
impending liability.
The EPA requires in the fifth condition correction and remediation of the
discovered violation within sixty days. The facility must certify in writing that
the violations have been corrected, and take appropriate measures to remedy
environmental or human harm. Condition six requires that the regulated entity
must agree in writing to take steps to prevent recurrence of the violation.
Under condition seven, repeated violations do not qualify for the policy's
positive incentives. Thus, the violation in question must not have occurred
within the past three years at the same facility. Moreover, the violation must
not be part of a pattern of federal, state or local violation by a parent organiza-
tion which occurred within the past five years. The eighth condition provides
that serious violations do not qualify. Violations must not result in serious
actual harm, or have presented an imminent and substantial endangerment to
human health or environment. Qualifying violations must also not violate
specific terms of any judicial or administrative order or consent agreement.
Finally, to qualify for the positive incentives under the policy, the ninth
condition requires that the facility cooperate with the EPA by providing all
requested documents and access to employees to assist with investigation,
assistance with noncompliance problems related to disclosure, in addition to
assistance with any environmental consequences related to violations.
In 1997, the EPA issued an Audit Policy Interpretive Guidance
("Guidance"). 154 This guidance answered several questions that arose in the
EPA Regional offices during the implementation of this policy. The EPA
addressed questions such as whether a violator would be deemed to have
voluntarily discovered its violations if done during an audit required as part of
a binding settlement.155 Also questioned was whether in order to comply with
the prompt disclosure requirement, an entity planning to perform an audit of
numerous similar facilities must send a separate notification to the EPA within
10 days of discovering each violation, or can the violator consolidate its
disclosures and submit them after the normal deadline. 56 The Guidance did
154. See Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator, U.S. EPA, to
Regional Administrators (Jan. 15, 1997).
155. EPA's response: Where a violator-without any legal obligation to do so--already
has committed to conducting a compliance audit prior to any formal or informal enforcement
response, an obligation to conduct such an audit with the same material scope and purpose can
be incorporated into a binding settlement with EPA without automatically disqualifying
violations discovered under the audit from obtaining penalty mitigation under the Audit Policy.
See id. Companies acquiring facilities should note that in "arm's length" transactions, the
current and former owners may be treated by the EPA as separate entities in certain
circumstances. For guidance, see Memorandum from A. Herman to Regional Administrators,
supra note 154.
156. EPA's response: A violator may consolidate its submission of certain information to
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not in any way expand the applicability of the EPA's Final Audit Policy to
violations not previously covered.
B. Congressional Activity
Legislation has been introduced that would prevent the EPA or DOJ from
using audit information in an enforcement action. A Senate bill introduced in
1997 is Section 866 titled "Environmental Protection Partnership Act 1997."
It has not to date been enacted."'
V. INCENTIVES FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION AS
RELATED TO COMPLIANCE AUDITING
Companies that viewed environmental regulation as simply an issue of
risk analysis are currently considering its role in advancing innovation and its
impact on competitiveness. 158 This effort is being assisted by forty-nine of the
fifty states.5 9 They have developed and implemented approximately 150
technical assistance programs designed to promote environmental compliance
and pollution prevention.' 6 Pollution prevention refers to a movement over the
past ten years toward the reduction of air emissions, waste discharges or waste
generation as opposed to "end-of-pipe control strategies."'161 Pollution
prevention arguably results in the use of less natural resources and elimination
of waste streams, resulting in financial savings.162 In contrast, compliance
auditing simply provides information to corporate decision makers about legal
and economic risk. 1
63
EPA, but the disclosure of potential violations still must be made to EPA within 10 days of
discovering a violation. See id.
157. A 1997 Senate hearing discussed section 866 and other audit issues. See
Environmental Audits Hearing, supra note 18.
158. See Carr & Thomas, supra note 16. See also Tony Lent & Richard P. Wells,
Corporate Environmental Management: Study Shows Shift from Compliance to Strategy, 1
TOTAL QUALITY ENVTL. MGMT. 379 (1992).
159. See Carol Foley & Michael Elliot, Systems Design and the Promotion of Pollution
Prevention: Building More Effective Technical Assistance Programs, 29 GA. L. REV. 450
(Winter 1995).
160. See id.
161. See Frances H. Irwin, An Integrated Framework for Preventing Pollution and
Protecting the Environment, 22 ENVTL. L. 35 (1992).
162. See generally Bradley C. Bobertz, The Tools of Prevention: Opportunities for
Promoting Pollution Prevention Under Federal Environmental Legislation, 12 VA. ENVrL. L.J.
1(1992).
163. See Steinzor, supra note 16; Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Green and
Competitive, 73 HARV. Bus. REV. 120 (1995); Noah Walley & Bradley Whitehead, It's Not
Easy Being Green, 72 HARV. Bus. REV. 46 (1994).
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Both pollution prevention and compliance auditing are important tools for
companies to prevent exposure to environmental liabilities. While potentially
expensive, each has the potential for achieving significant fixed capital and
operating costs reductions.'6" The prevention of environmental damage is
arguably preferable to the resulting required remedies.'( Similarly, preventing
the creation of environmental hazards is the most effective method of reducing
environmental expenditures."S
One author argues that audit immunity and/or privileges tend to decrease
the cost to businesses of addressing ongoing violations through internal
auditing; hence, reducing the incentive companies have to initially prevent
noncompliance. 1
67
Wherever prevention actually would succeed in eliminating or drastically
reducing risk beyond levels achievable through auditing, and audit
immunity results in a shift from prevention to auditing, audit immunity
must be understood as compliance-reducing rather than compliance
enhancing.' 6'
However, where pollution prevention would result in the same net regulatory
compliance as auditing, movement from compliance auditing to pollution
prevention would not result in any compliance benefits for the regulated
industry. 69 Yet, pollution prevention activities may provide public relations
benefits, worker safety and reduced costs to a company willing to expend the
capital to explore pollution prevention.
Managing compliance through auditing can be resource intensive. It may
limit the resources available for pollution prevention initiatives involving
process engineers, research staff, or equipment operators. 70 Another
institutional impediment may be the prior expenditures of significant resources
on pollution control technology.' 7' Therefore, traditional compliance assurance
activities may limit or eliminate resources needed to examine potential
pollution prevention activities.
164. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Environmental Auditing, (Pub. No. GAO/RCED-
95-37) (1995).
165. See Danna, supra note 16, at 976.
166. Tom Span, Manager of Environmental and Safety of a Lennox Industries, Inc.
Stuttgart, Arkansas plant, notes: "If you eliminate a waste stream, such as a discharging polluted
water, you do not need a permit and there is no need for a compliance audit of this part of the
operation." Telephone Interview with Tom Span, July 22, 1998.
167. See Danna, supra note 16, at 978.
168. See Danna, supra note 16, at 987.
169. See Danna, supra note 16, at 987.
170. See Michele Ochsner, Pollution Prevention: An Overview of Regulatory Incentives and
Barriers, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 593 (1998).
171. See id.
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Industry, the states, federal government and environmental groups often
have divergent views about statutory environmental audit privileges. 72 Still,
pollution prevention programs may be an opportunity for these divergent
stakeholders to reach a consensus on an issue. One author notes that amid the
current policy debate: "[T]he role of environmental law in providing crucial
incentives for pollution prevention tends to receive too little attention."'
173
A. Pollution Prevention Auditing
Pollution prevention is frequently referred to as "source reduction" or
"toxic use reduction," and can be defined as "the use of materials, processes or
practices that reduce or eliminate the creation of pollutants or wastes at the
source."' 174 Such activities offer potential enhancement of worker health and
safety procedures, hazardous materials accident prevention, less toxic
substances in commerce, and the environmentally responsible disposition of the
final product.77 However, establishing and implementing pollution prevention
programs may require significant experimentation to develop a process
modification or new product that conforms to industry or consumer specifica-
tions. 176 Also, the benefits are unpredictable. 17 Moreover, if the economic
incentives of pollution prevention do not achieve the savings required to
implement such measures companies may question the economic wisdom of
such an expenditure. 17 Two authors note: "An audit system can be designed
to assess improvements (or deficiencies) in such areas as: (i) the 'environmental
friendliness' of production processes; (ii) the effectiveness of management; (iii)
employee training; (iv) progress toward corporate goals; and (v) the adequacy
of internal policies and standards."' 179 Businesses often conduct audits in part
to obtain environmental insurance and investment capital.' Currently,
pollution prevention auditing is not always a part of a facility's environmental
assessment process. However, in the future as the efficiency of a process
172. See Beard, supra note 16, at 3.
173. See Ochsner, supra note 170, at 586.
174. Office of Research and Development, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Facility
Pollution Prevention Guide I (EPA/600/R-92/088, 1992). The EPA prepared a detailed
examination of pollution prevention activities in a recent publication titled Environmental
Protection Agency, Pollution Prevention 1997-A Progress Report (June 1997).
175. See Ochsner, supra note 170, at 601.
176. See Ochsner, supra note 170, at 591.
177. See Ochsner, supra note 170, at 591. The benefits might include raw material savings,
process efficiency and the market for "green" products. See Ochsner, supra note 170, at 591.
178. A legal mandate may be required. See Ochsner, supra note 170, at 591.
179. See Carr & Thomas, supra note 16, at 136-37.
180. See Carr & Thomas, supra note 16, at 136-37.
226 [Vol. 21
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AUDITS
becomes more important from a competitive perspective, the pollution
prevention audit may grow in importance.
Three activities are necessary for an effective pollution prevention
initiative:
(1) changes in raw material inputs to industrial systems, especially
reducing the use of toxic chemicals and of scare and nonrenewable natural
resources; (2) waste reduction by making industrial systems more efficient
in converting raw materials into products and wastes into valuable
byproducts; and (3) changes in the design, composition, and packaging of
products to create "green", or environmentally preferable, products that
minimize harm to public health and the environment over their entire
lifecycles."'
Michael Porter, a professor at Harvard Business School, believes
successful financial performance is compatible with environmental goals.182
Porter bases his view on the opportunities provided by reduction of resource
use and expenditures necessitated by remediation.'83 The financial resources
saved by such activities are available for pollution control and assist the long-
term competitiveness of U.S. companies.' Examples of these initiatives
include: 3M's "pollution prevention pays" program and Dow Chemical's
waste reduction project.85
Benchmarking,"' where a company compare itself with a "best-in class"
example, is another important concept in developing and implementing
pollution prevention because it shortens the learning curve and provides
concrete examples of what is realistically possible utilizing certain methods.
Examples of pollution prevention activities include projects designed to
"reduce scrapping, recycle solvent, recover and sell waste products and
improve housekeeping and maintenance functions."'
8 7
181. Joel S. Hirschhom, Pollution Prevention Comes ofAge, 29 GA. L. REv. 326 (Winter
1995).
182. See Steinzor, supra note 16, at 165.
183. See Michael E. Porter, America's Green Strategy, Sci. AM., Apr. 1991, at 168 ("The
conflict between environmental protection and economic competitiveness is a false
dichotomy.") Id.
184. See Steinzor, supra note 16, at 165.
185. See Steinzor, supra note 16, at 165.
186. For a further discussion of benchmarking, see Kenneth M. Karch, Benchmarking at
Environmental Management at Weyehauser, 3 TOTAL QUALITY MGMT. (1996) at 297-308.
187. See Ochsner, supra note 16, at 606.
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B. An Arkansas Example--Lennox Industries
Lennox Industries, Inc. has manufactured heating and air conditioning
equipment since 1895.188 Its 500,000 square feet Stuttgart, Arkansas plant
began operation in 1975 and employs 951 ' 9 Pollution prevention has been of
interest to this facility for the past ten years. 9° Tom Span, Manager of
Environment and Safety Department for the facility stated that "pollution
prevention not only makes good environmental sense, it also makes good
economic sense."'9' The company has for example expended $600,000 to
create LenLube, a product that has allowed Lennox to decrease air emissions
from sixty-one tons a year in 1989 to approximately three tons in 1996.192
Lennox states that LenLube contains "no volatile organic air emissions, is not
toxic and is not hazardous."' 93 However, Lennox had to revise a decades-old
process to create it. 94 Other Lennox pollution prevention programs include:
replacement of toluene-based adhesive in lieu of a water-based product; phase
out of lead-based sealant;' 95 and the elimination of chromium, cadmium and
lead in the metal finishing and painting operation.19 6
188. See Lennox Industries Inc. Earns Pollution Prevention Award, Arkansas Environment
("AEF") Federation Press Release, (Oct. 14, 1996) (On file with AEF) [hereinafter Lennox].
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See Interview with Tom Span, supra note 163.
192. See Lennox, supra note 188, at 1.
193. See Lennox, supra note 188, at 1.
194. See Lennox, supra note 188, at 1.
195. See Lennox, supra note 188, at 1.
196. See Lennox, supra note 1881. This results in a 100% reduction of hazardous waste
generated. See Lennox, supra note 188. Additional examples of pollution prevention
implementation are found in Kurt A. Strasser, Preventing Pollution, 8 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J.
1(1996).
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VI. ARKANSAS POLLUTION PREVENTION INCENTIVES
Economic incentives'97 can be either positive or negative.' 98 They are
analogous to the proverbial "carrot and stick." Positive incentives, such as free
compliance advice and technical assistance, may save-or provide additional
money, or produce other kinds of tangible benefits for a facility.' 99 When
facilities produce financial savings on manufacturing or compliance expendi-
tures, or receive a tax benefit or government subsidy, an incentive to
implement these policies is achieved.2°° In contrast, negative incentives might
be viewed as penalties or costs associated with a given activity. Enforcement
of environmental laws is a negative incentive. It makes non-compliance more
expensive for a business which therefore works to avoid the threat. One author
states: "In the purest form, negative incentives include avoiding liability for
cleanup costs or private damages, escaping punitive enforcement actions, and
keeping a company's image from becoming tarnished in the public eye."' 2 '
Both positive and negative incentives are important because they affect
the value of a business.20 2 Consequently, businesses seek to reduce, or at least
197. For a discussion of incentives see Marshall J. Breger et al., Providing Economic
Incentives in Environmental Regulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 463 (1991); Robert W. Hahn &
Robert N. Stavins, Incentive Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?
18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991); Timothy A. Wilkins, Agency Discretion and Advances in
Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a Model
for the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 479 (1995); Robert N. Stavins,
Project 88 Harnessing Market Forces to Protect Our Environment, (Washington D.C., 1988)
(on file with the Harvard Kennedy School of Government); Michael J. Casey, Economic and
Tax Incentives for a Cleaner Environment: A Survey of Marketable Pollution Permits and
Pollution Taxes, I DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 40 (1991); and David M. Driesen, Is Emissions
Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic
Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH & LEE L. REv. 289, 306 (1998) ('The term economic incentive
is attractive because it promises redemption from the plodding nature of governmental
decisions.").
198. See Steinzor, supra note 16, at 154. Another important concept is that of incremental
cost which can be defined as the economic difference between the cost of a baseline activity
and the cost of implementing an environmentally preferred alternative. See Timothy T. Jones,
Implementation of the Montreal Protocol: Barriers, Constraints and Opportunities, 3 ENvTL.
LAW 813, 849 (1997). See also J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical
Law-and Society System: A Wake Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern
Administrative State, 45 DuKE L. J. 849, 914 (1996); Royal C. Gardner, Exporting American
Values: Tenth Amendment Principles and International Environmental Assistance, 22 HARv.
ENvTL. L. REv. 1, 39 (1998); Jeffery L. Dunoff, From Green To Global: Toward the
Transformation of International Environmental Law, 19 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 241, 290
(1995).
199. See Steinzor, supra note 16, at 154.
200. See Steinzor, supra note 16, at 154.
201. Steinzor, supra note 16, at 155.
202. See Arnold, supra note 31, at 384.
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understand, the potential risks and costs of their regulated activities, including
the possibility of criminal and civil liability that could result from voluntary
disclosure.23 Large and small companies face similar risks. Nevertheless, the
benefits of auditing for larger companies arguably outweigh the perceived risk.
Because of the greater financial and technical resources2 4 larger companies are
better able to absorb the costs of environmental management systems, fines and
implementation of corrective actions, than many smaller companies.
25
A. Incentives for Pollution Prevention/Compliance Auditing
Several developments encourage regulated entities to embrace pollution
prevention. They include increasing expense of managing pollution and a
realization that it costs less to prevent it in the first place.2°6 The administrative
expense of ensuring compliance with the various environmental regulations
provides an incentive for companies to review possible pollution prevention
opportunities. °7 The avoidance of enforcement actions is more likely if
companies are diligent in addressing the issues.208 One author notes:
Corporate directors and officers exercise due diligence concerning law
compliance when they make good faith efforts to pursue law compliance
in conjunction with the corporate activities initiated and maintained under
their leadership. This will be the case if directors and officers institute
effective law compliance measures which are sufficient to support a good
faith belief by the directors and officers that corporate activities are being
conducted lawfully.20 9
203. See Beard, supra note 16, at 20.
204. See Kirk F. Marty, Moving Beyond the Body Count and Toward Compliance:
Legislative Options for Encouraging Environmental Self-Analysis, 20 VT. L. REv. 495, 500
(1995).
205. See id.
206. See Stephen M. Johnson, From Reaction To Proaction: The 1990 Pollution Prevention
Act, 17 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 153, 159 (1992).
207. See id.
208. Recently an official with the Office of the New York Attorney General stated that
environmental auditing is a part of the reasonable standard of care expected of regulated
entities, and is a "essential business practice." Companies conducting environmental audits may
receive deference in New York, as opposed to those not conducting audits (who may receive
stiffer penalties). See Companies that Fail to Audit May Face State Criminal Charges,
Prosecutors Say, 173 DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA) at D-3 (Sept. 9, 1994); see also Ronnie P.
Hawks, Environmental Self-Audit Privilege and Immunity: Aid to Enforcement or Polluter
Protection?, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 235,238 (Spring 1998).
209. Richard S. Gruner, Director and Officer Liability for Defective Compliance Systems:
Caremark and Beyond, 995 PLI/Corp 60-62 (June, 1997).
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Among the risks managers consider are governmental enforcement
activities or citizen suits in the event of non-compliance.2"' There is also the
common law obligation to avoid accidental releases.21 These legal and
financial risks of non-compliance often provide an appropriate incentive for
businesses to operate safely and within the law.212 Another factor motivating
pollution prevention is public opinion.213  Finally, businesses are also
implementing pollution prevention because it has the potential to increase the
efficiency of industrial processes.21' This is becoming an important consider-
ation in some instances as raw material and operating costs increase.
2
'
5
Effective enforcement of environmental laws, which is a negative
incentive, makes illegal activity problematic and expensive "by reducing the
illicit benefits of unpunished (or successful) misconduct, without affecting the
probability that it is detected by enforcement officials. 21 6 Perhaps one of the
most effective components of criminal enforcement is that the results of
enforcement activities, including potential prison sentences and loss of
government contracts, are not easily quantifiable and may have ramifications
that affect more than simple net-profit or loss. 2 17 Effective enforcement of
environmental laws therefore creates an incentive for facilities to examine
pollution prevention and conduct compliance auditing.
1. Governmental Pollution Prevention Mandates
Pollution prevention is increasingly mandated either through required
permits or as a SEP to settle enforcement actions. For example, the proposed
EPA Region 6 NPDES General Concentrated Animal Feeding Operation
("CAFO") Permit requires a pollution prevention plan.218 This permit will not
210. See Spicer, supra note 28, at 51-52.
211. See Spicer, supra note 28, at 51-52.
212. See Spicer, supra note 28, at 51-52. See also Samuel P. Hays, The Future of
Environmental Regulation, 15 J. L. & CoM. 565-66 (1996).
213. See Stephen M. Johnson, From Reaction To Proaction: The 1990 Pollution Prevention
Act, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 160 (1992).
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687, 693 (1997).
217. See Lois J. Schiffer & Allison B. Rumsey, Criminal Enforcement in a Cooperative
Environment, SB43 ALI-ABA 279, 299 (May 8, 1997).
218. See NPDES General Permits for Discharges From Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations, 63 Fed. Reg. 34,874, 34,882 (June 26, 1998). See also United States Department
of Agriculture and EPA, Draft Unified National Strategy for Animal Feeding Operations 18
(Sept. 11, 1998).
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be effective in Arkansas since it operates the Clean Water Act NPDES
program.21 9 Nevertheless, it may influence ADPC&E's CAFO efforts.
A current example of a pollution prevention mandate required in Arkansas
is a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") 20 program. RCRA
was amended by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984
("HSWA") 22' to require "generators of hazardous waste that ship their waste
off-site certify: (1) that they have a hazardous waste minimization program in
place to reduce the volume and toxicity of their waste "to the degree deter-
mined by the generator to be economically practicable" and (2) that the
proposed method of treatment, storage, or disposal of their waste is the
practicable method of treatment, storage, or disposal "currently available to the
generator which minimizes the present and future threat to human health and
the environment., 222  Similarly, HSWA also requires certification by
generators who treat, store, or dispose of waste within their own facilities.
223
These facilities are required to undertake such certification before they can
receive a permit.' The waste minimization mandate only applies to generators
and does not specify the content of the waste minimization plan.2'
Another example of pollution prevention requirements are the ADPC&E
permits (Industrial and Construction) required for owners or operators of
facilities discharging storm water associated with industrial activity or from
construction sites.226 To obtain permit coverage, an owner/operator must
develop a pollution prevention plan for the facility.227 The plans for the
219. See ADPC&E Reg. No. 6.
220. See 42 U.S.C. § 6901-92(k) (1994).
221. See Pub. L. No. 98-616,98 Stat. 3221 (1984) (codified within sections of 42 U.S.C.)
See generally U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE NATION's HAZARDOUS WASTE
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM AT A CROSSROADS: THE RCRA IMPLEMENTATION STUDY (1990).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b) (1988). The certification is required as part of the "manifest" that
hazardous waste generators must prepare when they transport waste to a treatment, storage or
disposal facility. See id. See also 40 C.F.R. § 262.20(a) (1990). Generators of hazardous waste
who produce between 100 and 1000 kilograms of the substances within a calendar month are
defined as "small quantity generators" and differnt rules apply. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d) (Supp.
1997). Of these facilities, EPA mandates generators to certify a "good faith effort" toward
waste minimization and that they selected the "best waste minimization method that is available
to [the generator] and that [the generator] can afford." 40 C.F.R. § 262 app. (1990). See
Stephen M. Johnson, From Reaction To Proaction: The 1990 Pollution Prevention Act, 17
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 167 (1992).
223. 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b) (1988).
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 6925(h) (1988); see also 40 C.F.R. § 264.73(b)(9) (1990).
225. See id. The EPA guidance on what a waste minimization program should entail is
found at 54 Fed. Reg. 25,056 (1989).
226. See ARK. CODEANN. § 8-4-101 etseq. (Michie 1997). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et
seq.
227. See ADPC&E Storm water Construction permit Ill(D) and Industrial permit Ill(C).
It must be prepared in accordance with good engineering practices.
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industrial activity permit must be developed within sixty days after a Notice of
Intent to be covered is given to ADPC&E.28 The permit for construction
activities requires the development of a pollution prevention plan.229
Also important is the federal Pollution Prevention Act of 1990.230 It
provided that pollution prevention projects could be a component of a penalty
assessed for violating regulations.2' The EPA decision to allow pollution
prevention projects to constitute SEPs, reduces penalties for violations based
on such expenditures. 232 Mr. Hirschhorn references an example:
In one enforcement case, the agency fined an electroplater $100,000 for
various violation of environmental regulations. The agency demanded a
payment of $50,000 and offered to forgive the remainder of the penalty if
the electroplater performed and submitted for review a detailed waste
minimization plan. The process changes reduced its waste by over sixty
percent and saved the company enough money to offset both the fine and
investments.233
2. Positive Incentive Programs (financial and technical assistance)
During the 1990s, over twenty-six states created pollution prevention,
waste reduction, or toxics use abatement programs. 234 These programs differ
in requirements and their aggressiveness, yet share similar definitions,
techniques, facility planning concepts, and a technical assistance component.235
Currently, there are several examples of incentive programs that
encourage and reward pollution prevention activities by regulated entities.
However, the majority of these programs are limited to small businesses.
Small businesses provide both important economic development and
employment, yet also posses a large potential for pollution and environmental
228. See ADPC&E Storm water Industrial permit III(C)( 1)(a)(1).
229. See ADPC&E Storm water Construction permit II(D)(1)(a).
230. See Hirschhom, supra note 181, at 331-32.
231. See Hirschhorn, supra note 181, at 331-32.
232. See Hirschhorn, supra note 181, at 331-32. See also Forced Volunteerism: The New
Regulatory Push to Prevent Pollution, Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA), January 22, 1993 available in
Westlaw 16 Chem 1996, BNA/ENV database.
233. Hirschhorn, supra note 181, at 332.
234. See Kenneth Geiser, The Unfinished Business of Pollution Prevention, 29 GA. L. REV.
476 (1995). The federal government also began to realize the importance of pollution
prevention. A 1993 Executive Order compelled federal facilities to implement a fifty percent
toxic emissions reduction by 1999 while also setting a voluntary source reduction target. See
Exec. Order No. 12,856, 58 Fed. Reg. 41,981, 41,983 (1993). The EPA also developed and
implemented the voluntary 33/50 program which involved a pledge by companies to reduce
their use of seventeen chemicals within a five year time frame. See 56 Fed. Reg. 7849-64
(1991).
235. See Geiser, supra note 234, at 476.
1999] 233
UALR LAW REVIEW
damage.26 Two programs with a broader focus are the Arkansas recycling tax
credit program 237 and the Arkansas Science and Technology Authority
("ASTA") grants.
The Arkansas program provides for a tax credit, as well as the "recapture
of the credit in certain instances, as an incentive for taxpayers to engage in
waste reduction, reuse and/or recycling activities." ADPC&E determines
whether a project is eligible for the tax credit. The program provides a
financial incentive for companies to employ new technology that uses
recyclables arguably enhancing pollution prevention.
The ASTA grant program was developed to assist Arkansas companies
with enhancing products or processes through transfer of technology, such as
pollution prevention activities, to improve competitiveness. The ASTA will
pay up to $3,750 for technology transfers to qualified applicant. Funding of
$375,000 was appropriated each 1996-97 biennium year for the Technology
Development and Technology Transfer programs. 23 The limited amount of
funding available restricts the size and complexity of potential projects and
recipients.
Small businesses in Arkansas2 39 often lack the necessary "technical and
financial resources to comply with the law, let alone engage in proactive
environmental management strategies like environmental auditing. 240 They
share the same enforcement risks but are more vulnerable because of their
size.241 A disincentive for small businesses to audit is that this activity and
related legal and technical advice about disclosure can be very expensive.24
2
For this reason, both the EPA and state agencies have created special programs
for small businesses. Under the CAA states are required to adopt small
236. See Harris, supra note 16, at 719.
237. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-501 et seq. The ADPC&E implements this program
through Reg. No. 16. See generally Wright & Monroe, supra note 5. Many states, including
Arkansas, also structure their regulations to the extent possible to encourage (or at least remove
disincentives) for the reuse of commercial and industrial wastes. For a discussion of various
relevant state provisions, including one in Arkansas, see Walter G. Wright, Jr., State Regulation
of the Beneficial Reuse of Manufacturing Residues, Presentation at the Air & Waste
Management Association's 88th Annual Meeting (June 1995).
238. See ASTA 96 Media Kit, Arkansas Science and Technology Authority (on file with
the ASTA). See also Technology Transfer Assitance Grant Program Rules (4-13-94) (on file
with the ASTA) For more information contact Mr. James T. Benham, Vice President, Finance,
ASTA, (501) 324-9006.
239. The definition of "small business" includes "a person, corporation, partnership, or
other entity who employs 100 or fewer individuals." 60 Fed. Reg. 32,676 (1995).
240. Harris, supra note 16, at 719.
241. See Beard, supra note 16, at 21.
242. See Miri Berlin, Environmental Auditing: Entering the Eco-Information Highway, 6
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 623 (1998).
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business compliance assistance programs.243 The EPA allows states to develop
programs that offer small businesses the opportunity to remedy violations
uncovered while participating in a compliance program. Compliance
assistance has been expanded to other federal environmental programs.244
Pursuant to the Mentor-Prot6g6 Partnership, the ADPC&E will provide
technical advice to small business using industry volunteers skilled in
environmental management issues. The volunteers are comprised of environ-
mental professionals from participating firms.245 These experts provide advice
on pollution prevention and regulatory compliance issues.246 There are two
different programs established under the "Clean Team." Program One is an
industry to industry assistance program that uses volunteers to provide free
technical assistance to participating businesses. To qualify, a small business
must have fewer than 100 full time employees. 247 Program Two is titled
Industry to Industry with Regulatory Assistance. ADPC&E, working with
private sector volunteers, will arrange an on-site multi-media environmental
audit.24' The program requires participants to achieve compliance within a
reasonable time period.249
The EPA also encourages compliance through voluntary programs. These
include programs250 similar to the ones EPA helped the states set up and
fund.211 These programs promote pollution prevention and compliance
243. See Lois J. Schiffer & Ann C. Juliano, Reform of Environmental Regulations: Three
Points, 12 WTRNAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 177 (1998).
244. See id.
245. The companies include: Albermarle Corp., American Transportation Corp.,
Amercable, Amoco Foam Products Co., Ark. Eastman Div., Arkansas Environmental Academy,
Atlantic Research Corp., Baxter Healthcare Corp., CH2M Hill, City of Fayetteville, City of
Morrilton, ConAgra Poultry Corp., Cooper Tire and Rubber Co., Crain Industries, Inc., Daisy
Mfg. Co., Inc., Darling Store Fixtures, Dassault Falcon Jet Corp., Entergy, Exxsorbet Technical
Services, Inc., F M Corp., Florida Drum Delta Corp., Georgia-Pacific Corp., Goodner Aircraft
Painting, Inc., Green Bay Packaging, Incop., Halstead Metal Products, International Paper,
Lennox Industries, Loral Vought Systems, Magnetics Ark., Nucor Steel, OK Industries, Osceola
Products Co., Pace Industries, Planters Co., Potlatch Corp., Quanex/Macsteel Div., Raytheon
Aircraft Corp., Remington Arms Co., Reynolds Metal Co., Rineco, Riverside Furniture Corp.,
S-B Power Tool Co., Sonat Exploration, Southwire Ark., Stephens Production, Structural
Metals, Inc., The Trane Co., Timex Corp., U.S. Vanadium Corp., UALR-Biology Dept.,
Viskase Corp., Weyerhaeuser Co.
246. See The Clean Team, Industry Helping Industy, ADPC&E (pamphlet on file with
ADPC&E).
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id.
250. See EPA Small Business Compliance Assistance Centers, EPA #305-F97-7003
(Spring 1998) (pamphlet on file with EPA Region 6). It provides phone numbers and web-site
addresses for EPA compliance assistance based on industrial sectors such as agriculture,
chemical, metal finishing, etc.
251. See U.S. EPA Region 6 Guidance for Submitting Proposals for Pollution Prevention
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auditing. They include EPA's 33/50 Program which involved a voluntary
pledge by relevant industries to reduce emissions of seventeen chemicals by
thirty-three percent by 1992 and fifty percent by the end of 1995.252
Besides incentives for pollution prevention, EPA also recognizes the
importance of providing incentives for small businesses. The EPA Small
Business Policy provides guidance to state and local governments on the
development of these incentives. 2 3 The Small Business Policy's 4 goal was
to expand the Clean Air Act's Small Business Assistance Program ("SBAP") 5
to other media.5 6
The Small Business Policy allows a state, under some circumstances, to
refrain from initiating an enforcement action for ninety days and to keep
confidential the name and location of small businesses meeting the Policy's
requirements. 257
The EPA's Interim Policy on Compliance Incentives for Small Businesses
was designed to "promote environmental compliance among small businesses
by providing incentives for participation in compliance assistance programs,
and encouraging the prompt correction of violations., 25' When it is clear that
a small company acted with good-faith in attempting to comply with
environmental regulations, no evidence of criminal activities is present, and
"that there is no significant health, safety, or environmental threat, the EPA will
either mitigate or refrain from initiating civil penalties. ' 259 Further, when a
small business voluntarily discloses and addresses environmental non-
compliance through participation in a compliance assistance program, the EPA
will forgo the penalty.260 However, despite the need to encourage small
businesses to comply and ensure they have the necessary resources to make
informed decisions, if small businesses and large businesses have different
Incentives for States FY 1998, Grant/Cooperative Agreement Funds (program 1-2) (On file with
EPA Region 6). It provides funding for Region 6 states for pollution prevention programs.
252. See Hirschhom, supra note 181, at 332-33.
253. See Beard, supra note 16, at 22.
254. See also Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (as
amended by Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, at 5 U.S.C. §
611(a)(3)(A)) (1994). See generally Barry A. Pineles, The Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act: New Options in Regulatory Relief, 5 COMMLAW CONsPECTUs 29
(1997).
255. See the Clean Air Act's Small Business Assistance Program (SBAP) (Interim Policy
on Compliance for Small Businesses, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,677 (1995).
256. See Beard, supra note 16, at 23.
257. Beard, supra note 16, at 23.
258. Interim Policy on Compliance Incentives for Small Businesses, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,675
(1995). See also Beard, supra note 16, at 22.
259. Beard, supra note 16, at 23.
260. See Beard, supra note 16, at 23.
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rules, "the effectiveness of each program will suffer due to inconsistent
application, financial inequities, and general uncertainty.
2 61
B. Potential Future Arkansas Incentives
Pollution prevention is generally considered an activity worth
encouraging. Unfortunately, pollution prevention is not always cost-effective,
requiring incentives and subsidies262 such as tax breaks 263 to encourage its use.
Otherwise, pollution prevention may not provide enough "return on
investment."' 4 An important consideration is "whether the benefits of a given
incentive will accrue over the short or long-term, especially from a corporate
perspective. Investments in superior performance often deliver economic
benefits over the long run. Yet proposals to commit corporate resources to
such investments typically compete with other potential uses of the funds that
deliver a larger return over the short run. 265 Perhaps the greatest problem in
addressing these trade-offs is also the largest deterrent to the development and
implementation of pollution prevention.2' Regardless of the government and
industry incentives, pollution prevention issues often do not reach the corporate
decision makers, and thus, they are easily marginalized in larger discussions of
business operations.26
7
Pollution prevention activities may still be the most cost-effective method
to achieve regulatory compliance since, in some instances, they provide a lower
net cost to the company compared to end-of-pipe technologies; yet the
activities "may or may not be profitable in an absolute sense."26 The financial
resources expended for pollution prevention will be judged by the funds saved
on field inspections, accident prevention and training, and expenditures on
cleanup costs and site remediation.2 These pollution prevention initiatives are
261. See Beard, supra note 16, at 23.
262. For a discussion of environmental subsidies, see Robert F. Blomquist, Models and
Metaphors for Encouraging Responsible Private Management of Transboundary Toxic
Substances Risk: Toward a Theory of International Incentive-Based Environmental
Experimentation, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 507, 548 (1997).
263. For a discussion of the subject see Kirk W. Junker, Tax Exemption for Pollution
Control Devices in Pennsylvania, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 503 (1996); Miriam Joels Silver, Note,
Federal Tax Incentives for Historic Preservation: A Strategy for Conservation and Investment,
10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 887 (1982). See also David C. Holtz, Monica Heitzmann, "Primary
Purpose" Pollution Control Tax Incentives: Is the Public Getting What It's Paying For? 31
LAND & WATER L. REv. 401 (1996).
264. See Ochsner, supra note 16, at 608-09.
265. See Steinzor, supra note 16, at 155-56.
266. See Steinzor, supra note 16, at 155-56.
267. See Geiser, supra note 234, at 491.
268. See Ochsner, supra note 16, at 720.
269. See Harris, supra note 16, at 720.
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designed to avoid problems and expenditures.27° Yet, pollution prevention does
not always provide short-term returns on investment. 271 "Although the savings
achievable through simple changes in procedures (e.g., changes in housekeep-
ing and inventory) may be obvious, the nature of the investment needed to
implement more complex source reduction projects (such as those involving
manufacturing technology or product formulas) may be far less clear."'2 2
However,
corporate shareholders-the residual claimants to the profits of corpora-
tions-are increasingly recognizing that corporate compliance problems
which produce large fines or liabilities can significantly damage share-
holder interests.273
Still, regardless of the potential for enforcement actions, some businesses do
not perform compliance audits.274 The reasons for such reluctance varies. The
causes may include: ambivalence concerning environmental laws; the lack of
the financial resources necessary for implement auditing; or, the belief that the
risks of auditing overshadow the potential benefits.275  Compounding the
diffculties in implementing pollution prevention, companies also face the
dilemma of component decision making, where "the choice of an alternative
can impose costs which are directly borne by other divisions or departments in
the firm, and of which (the decision maker) has imperfect knowledge. 276
The development of new assistance programs for pollution prevention and
auditing might increase compliance with environmental laws in Arkansas.
Programs should be based on sectoral delineation such as metal finishing,
wood finishing, chemical production, etc.277 They should target both industry
270. See Harris, supra note 16, at 720.
271. See Harris, supra note 16, at 720.
272. See Harris, supra note 16, at 720.
273. Richard S. Gruner, General Counsel In An Area Of Compliance Programs and
Corporate Self-Policing, 46 EMORY L.J. 1134 (1997). For corporate environmental information
disclosure and Securities and Exchange Commission rules, see generally Michael Gollub,
Reducing Uncertainty in Environmental Disclosure: Why the Securities and Exchange
Commission Should Return to the Basics, 4 ENvTL. LAW. 311 (Feb. 1998). See also John W.
Bagby et al., How Green Was My Balance Sheet?: Corporate Liability and Environmental
Disclosure, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 225 (1995).
274. See Kirk F. Marty, Moving Beyond the Body Count and Toward Compliance:
Legislative Options for Encouraging Environmental Self-Analysis, 20 VT. L. REv. 499-500
(1995).
275. See id.
276. Carol Foley & Michael Elliot, Systems Design and the Promotion of Pollution
Prevention: Building More Effective Technical Assistance Programs, 29 GA. L. REV. 449, 465
(1995). See also Jacques Cremer, Corporate Culture and Shared Knowledge, 2 INDUs. & CORP.
CHANGE 351, 360 (1993).
277. Benchmarking may be an appropriate method of comparing companies capacity, base
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sectors and pollutants with the most significant potential impact on the
environment. Both the federal and state governments might consider limited
grants or loan assistance programs targeted toward funding of compliance
auditing or pollution prevention.278 Financial assistance might allow companies
to hire consultants or train an employee for compliance responsibilities.
27 9
Another promising idea is the use of recognition and awards programs, such
as the AEF Pollution Prevention Awards, to encourage pollution prevention
and compliance activities.
2 0
State or federal agencies could additionally advocate incentives for
compliance auditing by methods that do not involve a privilege or impact third
parties.28' Legislation developed in New Jersey, which provides "a 'grace
period' for minor violations that are promptly reported and corrected" is
2812instructive. Any violation exceeding twelve months in duration is exempted.
VII. CONCLUSION
Both the federal and state environmental regulatory programs pose a
challenge to Arkansas businesses. The challenge stems, to a certain extent,
from both their complexity and penchant for change. This of course poses a
special burden for smaller businesses. Nevertheless, the need for compliance
is critical in view of the twin threat of both governmental and citizen suit
enforcement. Many companies have been using environmental compliance
auditing as a tool to facilitate compliance for many years and the regulated
community, for a variety of reasons, appears to view self-examination and self-
correction as an important compliance tool.28 3 However, some companies fear
on sectoral determination. The assistance programs could facilitate benchmarking studies in
an industry sector and use the information and the political strength of the "buy in" associated
with such an approach to evaluate the sector's organizational and technological needs." See
Foley & Elliot, supra note 276, at 471.
278. See Harris, supra note 16, at 23. To enhance compliance and pollution prevention
assistance programs, the program should:" (1) improve companies' organizational capability
to address problems systemically; and (2) help them systemically to reduce the environmental
impact of their manufacturing practices." These programs could also benefit from an
assessment mythology or diagnostic test to determine the companies technological and
organizational capacity. See Carol Foley, Michael Elliot, Systems Design and the Promotion
of Pollution Prevention: Building More Effective Technical Assistance Programs, 29 GA. L.
REv. 449,471 (Winter 1995).
279. See Harris, supra note 16, at 23.
280. See Ochsner, supra note 16, at 615.
281. See Spicer, supra note 28, at 53.
282. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1D-125 to 131 (West Supp. 1996). See Spicer, supra note 16,
at 53. However, this amnesty legislation may be subject to the same concerns and potential
problems concerning authorization of federal programs to states.
283. See Carr & Thomas, supra note 16, at 97.
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that the results of an audit may be used against them. This is a special concern
in the case of federal statutory citizen suits since such plaintiffs are clearly not
bound by the enforcement discretion both the EPA and the DOJ have
articulated in their audit policies.
Various states, including Arkansas, have responded to this issue through
the enactment of audit privilege statutes. Arkansas' 1995 legislation was fairly
typical of those statutes that simply provide privilege as opposed to immunity.
Nevertheless, it is clear that unless Congress intervenes with federal legislation,
that in Arkansas and a number of other states, the privilege laws will be
modified to accommodate EPA concerns. An additional tool that warrants
further consideration over the next decade is pollution prevention. Careful
consideration of the net benefits of this tool to some companies should be
considered. Also, further attention should be focused on the ability of the
government to encourage such activities through the expansion and/or
development of various incentives.
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